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43 
Terry’s Original Sin 
Jeffrey Fagan† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Mapp v. Ohio,1 the U.S. Supreme Court extended the due 
process protections of the exclusionary rule to include all 
“constitutionally unreasonable searches” that were done without a 
basis of probable cause.2 In the seven years after Mapp, when homicide 
rates in the U.S. nearly doubled,3 riots broke out in at least forty-seven 
U.S. cities.4 During the same era, a heroin epidemic gripped the 
nation’s urban centers,5 giving rise to street drug markets and 
associated violence and pressures on law enforcement to curb those 
markets.6 As violence increased, a turn in the nation’s political culture 
questioned Mapp’s restraints on police discretion to stop and search 
criminal suspects.7 Indeed, some writers wondered if the Mapp 
standard, with its reliance on the exclusionary rule to deter violations 
 
 †  Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, and Professor of Epidemiology,  
Columbia University. Thanks to Amanda Geller and John MacDonald for their contributions to 
the analysis. Rachel Harmon, Wayne Logan, Sonja Starr, David Sklansky, Erik Luna and 
workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School provided important comments on 
earlier drafts. Thanks to Logan Gowdey and Sophia Harris for excellent research assistance. 
Jeffrey Fagan served as expert witness for plaintiffs in Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ligon v. City of New York, 959 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2013); and Davis v. City of  
New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). All opinions and errors also are solely mine. 
 1  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 2  Id. at 655. 
 3  Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, Estimated Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter 
1961–68, http: //www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeTrendsInOneVar.cfm [https: // 
perma.cc /B49Y-C3B8]. 
 4  KERNER COMM’N, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 19–60 (1968). 
 5  See, e.g., Michael Agar and Heather Schacht Reisinger, A Heroin Epidemic at the 
Intersection of Histories: The 1960s Epidemic Among African Americans in Baltimore, 21 MED. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 115 (2002). 
 6  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189 (1965) (discussing the links between the rise of heroin addiction and 
criminal violence in the mid-1960s); see generally 2 LEON HUNT & CARL CHAMBERS, THE HEROIN 
EPIDEMICS: A STUDY OF HEROIN USE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1965–75 (1976). 
 7  See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 665, 739 (1970). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2839331 
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of Fourth Amendment rights, had inflicted social costs on the public 
through over-deterrence of police, leading to elevated crime rates.8 
It was no surprise, then, that after those seven years the Supreme 
Court in Terry v. Ohio9 “uncoupled . . . the two clauses of the Fourth 
Amendment” that regulated temporary detentions and searches by 
police.10 Terry dealt with a different “rubric of police conduct”: the beat 
officer stopping and patting down an individual on the street, more 
commonly known as an “investigative stop.”11 The Terry test was (and 
is) thus to balance the scope of the intrusion against the “specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”12 Justice Douglas, in 
dissent, labeled this “reasonable suspicion.”13 Although intended to be a 
narrow departure from Mapp’s standard, it was in fact a big break from 
Mapp.14 The Court said that the Mapp rule simply did not fit the 
realities of street policing in an era of rising crime rates. 
Under Terry, the police must articulate specific and individualized 
indicia of suspicion, and those indicia must be salient enough to justify 
police action. Hunches by police worried the Terry Court.15 The 
standards then and now do not really tell a police officer doing modern 
police work how much suspicion is enough to satisfy constitutional 
standards, or when the quantity of suspicion reaches a threshold of 
“reasonableness” to justify the intrusion. That question became even 
more challenging as a series of opinions inflated the scope of 
“reasonable suspicion” to include pretextual probable cause stops—
often minor traffic violations—that open the door to investigations of 
other crimes,16 or stops where a suspect’s presence in a “high crime 
 
 8  See generally Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) 
About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary 
Rule: An Empirical Assessment, in 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585 (Summer 1983); see also Potter 
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1439–40 (1983); William 
J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 445 
(1996). 
 9  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 10  See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 900 (1998). 
 11  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 35. 
 12  Id. at 21. 
 13  Id. at 38. 
 14  See id. at 27 (“[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search 
for weapons for the protection of the police officer . . . .”). 
 15  Id. at 22. 
 16  See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also David A. Sklansky, 
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2839331 
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area” multiplies less salient factors into actionable suspicion,17 or 
facially subjective rationales such as “furtive movements” or other 
“criminal appearances.” 
As the fiftieth anniversary of the Terry opinion approaches, it is 
more than reasonable to ask whether Terry’s move away from probable 
cause was original sin—whether the dilution and expansion of 
standards for an investigative stop over time compromised or advanced 
the very law enforcement interests that animated the Terry opinion. 
Two criteria of (constitutional) focus are wrapped up in the “law 
enforcement interest” doctrine: catching offenders and seizing 
contraband (hit rates), and controlling crime (crime rates). Whether 
contemporary and expanded Terry standards can achieve or undermine 
these interests is the primary question for this paper. 
Do these sins pay? This is the central question for this article. Sins 
where officers stop, temporarily detain, question, and possibly frisk a 
person based on the person’s vague or subjectively perceived actions 
(appearances, movements) may be less efficient in locating contraband 
or suppressing crime than stops based on actuarial characteristics 
(locations). But both may be less efficient than stops based on 
behavioral indicia of crime. In other words, this article asks empirically 
whether stops based on indicia that approximate probable cause (based 
on behavioral indicia that are unambiguously indicative of crime) 
advance law enforcement interests significantly more than stops based 
on the more subjective and vague standards that have become 
commonplace features of contemporary investigative stop programs. 
Perhaps these sins pay for only certain types of crime. Terry’s 
ruling came in the midst of a violent crime spike in the late 1960s 
through the early 1970s.18 But Terry is now applied broadly for violent 
and other serious crimes as well as for drug and weapon offenses. And 
in an era of proactive and “broken windows” policing, minor 
misdemeanors are theorized as predicates of crime and therefore are 
indicia of suspicion in and of themselves.19 This leads to the second 
question for this paper: whether the dilution of standards has 
differential effects by crime seriousness. 
 
271, 274–91 (1997). 
 17  See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); see also Andrew Ferguson & Damien 
Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for 
Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1606 (2008). 
 18  See Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, supra note 3. 
 19  See generally Phillip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (2000); see 
also JACK MAPLE WITH CHRIS MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: PUTTING THE BAD GUYS OUT OF 
BUSINESS (2000). 
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The answers to these questions follow. The first section assesses 
the doctrinal progression from Mapp to Terry, showing that the original 
officer safety rationale was eclipsed over time by Terry’s crime control 
agenda. The second section presents the details of the empirical inquiry 
on the two research questions. Data on crimes, stops, and arrests from 
2004 to 2012 from the Floyd v. City of New York20 litigation are 
analyzed to address these questions. The data include the bases of 
suspicion for each stop, and stops are assigned as probable cause or 
suspicion stops based on the articulated rationale. The third section 
presents the empirical results. The analyses show significant 
reductions in crime in neighborhoods (census block groups) with 
greater numbers of probable cause stops, and ratios of probable cause 
stops to other stops. The opposite, however, is not evident. Crime 
neither increases nor decreases in places with higher numbers of non-
probable cause stops; those stops simply have no effect on local crime 
rates. This is an empirical argument about what kinds of police 
observations of suspicion are indicative of criminal activity, and how 
acting on those indicia can advance Terry’s public safety agenda. 
The final section discusses a set of potential regulatory and 
doctrinal responses to these results that suggest the application of 
harm principles to inform the practice of Terry stops that raise privacy 
and positive liberty interests. This section presents a functional, 
institutional argument about what kinds of observations of supposedly 
suspicious activity are susceptible to meaningful review and oversight. 
It turns out that redemption for Terry’s sins may be close at hand: 
fleshing out the Terry standard by setting clear rules about what 
constitutes “reasonable suspicion,” and concretely linking the Terry 
standard to specific actions indicative of criminal activity will reduce 
errors in suspicion and better prevent crime. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. From Mapp to Terry 
Bad timing is one factor that led to the shift in standards for 
investigative stops and searches from Mapp to Terry. Rising violent 
crime rates through much of the 1960s,21 together with riots in dozens 
of American cities,22 helped create new social tensions and a legal and 
 
 20  959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 21  See generally PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra 
note 6.  
 22  KERNER COMM’N, supra note 4; see also Fred R. Harris & Roger W. Wilkins, Quiet Riots: 
Race and Poverty in the United States, in THE KERNER REPORT: TWENTY YEARS LATER (1988). 
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policy context in which law enforcement interests eclipsed the restraint 
on Fourth Amendment violations that was Mapp’s inspiration. As crime 
rates continued to rise through the next two decades, the focus of 
Terry’s jurisprudence—and the law enforcement interests that it 
embodied—shifted from officer safety to public safety. The standards 
regulating reasonable suspicion, the foundation of Terry, also shifted 
over time as the public safety interests of Terry hardened and 
expanded. In this section, the trajectory of this subtle jurisprudential 
shift is examined, laying the foundation of contemporary Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence on the limits of police stop-and-search 
power. 
1. What Mapp did and did not do. 
In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary 
rule applies to state prosecutions.23 The Court had previously held that 
the exclusionary rule applies to unconstitutionally seized evidence in 
federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States.24 But when the Court 
applied the  Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause to the states in Wolf 
v. Colorado,25 the Court held that the exclusionary rule was not a 
necessary component of the Fourth Amendment’s protection.26 
Mapp thus stands for the proposition that the probable cause 
requirement is toothless if not backed by a consequence that “remov[es] 
the incentive to disregard it.”27 The Weeks Court more fully discussed 
the details of the probable cause requirement.28 In Weeks, the Court 
held for the first time that the Constitution requires exclusion from 
federal criminal prosecutions evidence obtained without a warrant, 
issued by a judge, supported by probable cause, and describing the 
object of the search. Implicit in the Weeks decision is the proposition 
that the “reasonableness” of a given search under the first clause of the 
Fourth Amendment is defined by the warrant requirement in the 
second clause of the amendment.29 More specifically, Weeks said the 
Fourth Amendment protects individuals against “all unreasonable 
 
 23  367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). 
 24  232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 25  338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 26  See id. at 33. 
 27  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
 28  Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393–94. 
 29  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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searches and seizures,” which it then defined as those searches done 
without a “warrant issued as required by the Constitution.”30 
Similarly, Mapp described itself as “extending the substantive 
protections of due process,” that is, the exclusionary rule, “to all 
constitutionally unreasonable searches”—those done without a warrant 
issued on a showing of probable cause.31 The meaning of an 
unreasonable search was a search conducted without a warrant; the 
two clauses of the Fourth Amendment were linked.32 
2. The limits of exclusion. 
Earl Dudley notes that the meanings of neither reasonable 
suspicion to justify a frisk nor Terry stops to justify minor “physical 
intrusions” are readily apparent from the text of the Terry opinion.33 In 
Adams v. Williams,34 the first post-Terry decision on stop and frisk, 
Justice Rehnquist doubled-down on the Warren Court’s reasonableness 
standard by conflating “stops” with protective “frisks,” and applying the 
same vague reasonableness standard to both levels of intrusion.35 
The phrase “reasonable suspicion” comes from Justice Douglas’s 
dissenting opinion, when he criticized the Court’s departure from the 
“certainty” and historical grounding of the probable cause 
requirement.36 Scott Sundby similarly notes, “Chief Justice Warren’s 
cautious opinion suggests that the use of the reasonableness balancing 
test was meant to be viewed as a narrow departure from the norm of 
probable cause.”37 And Stephen Saltzburg argues that, taking the 
opinion at face value, “the Court would appear to have decided little.”38 
Therefore, for courts in the aftermath of Terry, it was not at all clear 
 
 30  Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392–93. 
 31  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655–56. 
 32  Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and 
Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1998). 
 33  Dudley, supra note 10, at 896. 
 34  407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 35  See id. at 146 (“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or 
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.”); see also Carol Steiker, 
Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L. J. 329, 338 (2013). 
 36  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Stephen A. 
Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911, 929 (1998). It is 
almost bitterly ironic that Justice Douglas’s phrase has come to be so closely associated with the 
Terry standard he disagreed with. It was not until Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, that the 
Court referred to the Terry standard as “reasonable suspicion.” 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973); see also 
Saltzburg, supra, at 945. 
 37  Sundby, supra note 32, at 1135. 
 38  Saltzburg, supra note 36, at 925–26. 
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how to regulate investigative stops in a novel framework of reasonable 
suspicion. 
However, before the Court reached the merits of Terry’s claim, it 
discussed the exclusionary rule in a highly suggestive way that 
highlights the break the Court was making from Mapp.39 In effect, the 
Court said that the exclusionary rule was powerless and irrelevant to 
the realities of contemporary beat policing.40 First, the Court noted 
that, for many interactions, “the police either have no interest in 
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest 
of serving some other goal,” rendering the exclusion of evidence 
useless.41 Second, the Court mentioned the risk of “wholesale 
harassment” of minority groups by police, but again stated that this 
“will not be stopped by the exclusion of . . . evidence from any criminal 
trial.”42 
Third and most important, the Court stated that applying the 
exclusionary rule where it is incapable of stopping police abuse “may 
exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent 
crime.”43 This mention of the crime control objective is muted here, but 
grows in importance in subsequent rulings, and occupies center stage 
in the Floyd litigation and in replications of the Terry regime in a 
swath of U.S. cities and across several countries.44 In effect, the Court 
took a lesser of evils approach where abuses—both of minorities and 
the boundaries of investigative stops—are tolerated in return for 
 
 39  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12–15. 
 40  Id.; see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(stating “[I doubt that] the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have 
allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such 
indignity”). Justice Scalia went on to say, however, that the framers were not concerned with the 
likelihood that the criminals of that day were carrying concealed firearms. Id.; see also Erich J. 
Segall, Will the Real Justice Scalia Please Stand Up?, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101, 106–07 (2015) 
(quoting Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Dickerson and explaining his qualification of his own 
ambivalence on Terry’s “petty indignities”). 
 41  Terry, 392 U.S. at 14. 
 42  Id. at 14–15; see, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213, 
1218 (1998) (discussing a nosology of harms that are inevitable in the proactive policing regimes 
that emerged in the 1990s); Anthony Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
956, 962–73 (1999) (revisiting Terry to show its forgotten racial meaning and implications); 
Jeffrey Fagan, Ackerman Lecture Series on Equality and Justice: Indignities of Order 
Maintenance (Nov. 21, 2013) (showing the racial components of the dignity incursions inherent in 
Terry stops).  
 43  Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
 44  See, e.g., AMY LERMAN & VESLA WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL (2014); Ben Bradford et al., Police, Crime and 
Order: The Case of Stop and Search, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POLICING 
(Summer 2016); Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of 
Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 163 (2015). 
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enhanced crime control, a matter that is challenged in the empirics 
here. 
The focus on the limits of the exclusionary rule at the beginning of 
the Terry opinion reads as a justification for applying a standard other 
than probable cause to the types of investigative stops upheld in Terry. 
The Court says that the Mapp rule does not fit the realities of beat 
policing because it is too slow to account for public safety concerns and 
because the remedy—exclusion of evidence—fails to correct police 
misconduct. In effect, the Court minimized the possibility of deterrent 
effects on future police misconduct of the suppression of evidence. The 
Terry standard of reasonable suspicion is thus a vindication of the 
Court’s public-safety concerns over the trial-focused exclusionary rule 
of Mapp. Perhaps the Court had a regulatory purpose in mind instead 
of a deterrence purpose.  The Court was optimistic that police could 
lean heavily on the internal processes and self-discipline of their 
institutions to do the work that would have fallen within Mapp’s 
litigation domain. But the Court also discounted the prospect of an 
inevitable parade of suppression hearings that would follow the  shift 
from the more demanding Mapp standard to the subjective, if not 
inchoate, standard in Terry. 
B. The Terry Standard and the Regulation of Police: Defining—or 
Failing to Define—Reasonable Suspicion 
The new Terry standards did no favor to trial courts by defining in 
such a subjective way the new standards for street stops that could be 
challenged. But as the analysis of those standards in this section 
shows, the Court may have (whether by design or not) mitigated that 
risk by advancing a standard where subjectivity was subordinated to a 
highly proceduralized standard. 
1. Terry, investigative stops, and a new set of state intrusions. 
By requiring reasonable suspicion for stop and frisks, Terry 
extended the Fourth Amendment to seizures less intrusive than 
arrests. In effect, the Supreme Court “uncoupled . . . the two clauses of 
the Fourth Amendment.”45 The Terry Court did not overrule Mapp: the 
warrant requirement, backed by the exclusionary rule, still applies to 
the traditional police-at-the-front-door search of an individual’s 
dwelling.46 But it is hard not to see Terry as a victory for police because 
 
 45  Dudley, supra note 10, at 900. 
 46  Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (“We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever 
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it recovers much of the discretion and, to be frank, the power that had 
been revoked in Mapp,47 and later in Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville.48 
Terry dealt with a different “rubric of police conduct” than did 
Mapp: the beat officer stopping and patting down an individual on the 
street.49 In footnote sixteen, the Terry majority went further: it refused 
to consider the question of whether an “investigative ‘seizure’ upon less 
than probable cause for purposes of ‘detention’ and/or interrogation” 
violates the Fourth Amendment.50 Then the Court narrowly defined the 
notion of “seizure” as instances “when the officer, by means of physical 
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a 
citizen.”51 
Still, even as the Court “emphatically reject[ed]” suggestions that 
the stop-interrogate-and-frisk interaction is not subject to the Fourth 
Amendment,52 the Court just as clearly rejected the notion that 
probable cause was required for the “limited search for weapons” at 
issue in the case.53 It is not hard to see the standard for such limited 
searches metastasizing over time into the Floyd regime in New York, 
with millions of street searches over a decade producing few guns or 
contraband.54 Instead, the Court adopted a rule from a case involving 
administrative searches of homes, Camara v. Municipal Court,55 
requiring courts to “balanc[e] the need to search (or seize) against the 
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”56 
The Terry test, in turn, balanced the scope of the intrusion (e.g., 
whether the police officer “patted down the outer clothing” or 
“conduct[ed] a general exploratory search”) against the “specific and 
 
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant 
procedure . . . .”). 
 47  David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric 
Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 985 (1998) (“[T]he 
conclusion is inescapable that in Terry the police won back a significant part of the power they 
needed to conduct business according to pre-Mapp standards.”). 
 48  405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
 49  Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 
 50  Id. at 19 n.16; see also Dudley, supra note 10, at 896–98. 
 51  Terry, 392 U.S at 19 n.16. 
 52  Id. at 16. 
 53  Id. at 25–26. 
 54  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Report of 
Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 
01034) (hereinafter Fagan Report); Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., Floyd v. 
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034) (hereinafter Fagan 
Supplemental Report). 
 55  387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 56  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 537). 
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articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.”57 This move in effect 
distinguishes Terry from Mapp and all cases involving actual arrests. 
Because “[a]n arrest is the initial stage of criminal prosecution,” it 
serves very different social interests than a Terry search, which was 
designed to protect “the police officer, where he has reason to believe he 
is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.”58 
Although the majority opinion does not address a frisk or pat-
down, a Terry frisk also required reasonable suspicion that the 
individual being frisked presents a danger to the officer or others at the 
time.59 This specificity requirement is in contrast with the “inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’” which is insufficient to 
justify the intrusion on an individual’s liberty.60 On the other hand, the 
Court’s disapproval of “hunches” was tempered by its tolerance of “the 
specific reasonable inferences which [the police officer] is entitled to 
draw from the facts in light of his experience.”61 Ultimately, the 
standard is characterized by the Terry Court as “objective,” and must 
hold up to the “more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge” who is to 
ask whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ 
that the action taken was appropriate.” This approach requires 
balancing the level of suspicion of danger against the invasion of 
privacy and autonomy, something that an officer in the moment of an 
encounter with a citizen may be hard pressed to do.62 
After nearly four decades, the Terry standard remains rather 
opaque.63 In describing the government’s burden, William Stuntz 
analogizes to a statistical determination: 
The threshold is not defined mathematically, but one could 
easily enough think of it that way, and courts and lawyers 
basically do think of it that way . . . . (Though, I should quickly 
add, there is no clear agreement on what the right mathematical 
 
 57  Id. at 21, 29–30. 
 58  Id. at 26–27. 
 59  Id. at 21. 
 60  Id. at 27. 
 61  Id.; see also Thompson, supra note 42, at 971 (noting that the Court celebrated Officer 
McFadden’s lengthy tenure and experience in policing the same neighborhood where he stopped 
John Terry and his colleagues). 
 62  Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added). 
 63  Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 850 (2011); see, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 42, at 1215 (“[R]easonable suspicion 
has never received a solid definition. (Perhaps it can’t).”). 
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line is. Probable cause officially means “a fair probability;” in 
practice, it means, roughly, more-likely-than-not. Reasonable 
suspicion plainly requires less than probable cause. A good 
approximation, then, might be something like a one-in-five or 
one-in-four chance.)64 
Thus, the burden of proof is quite low. Given an estimate of a 
twenty or twenty-five percent chance a crime is about to occur or has 
occurred, proving a “hunch”—the type of suspicion, with a capacious 
tolerance for error, Terry condemns—requires a very low probability 
indeed. 
2. Regulating reasonableness. 
In the same part of the opinion that explains the shortcomings of 
the exclusionary rule as a check on street policing, Terry appears to 
suggest that the rule remains the primary judicial check. For instance, 
the Court says that, when applying Terry, if courts identify “over-
bearing or harassing” conduct, “it must be condemned by the judiciary 
and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.”65 Still, 
the Court here is directing lower courts to focus on conduct during the 
stop, not the indicia of suspicion that motivated the stop. 
The Court in fact excluded evidence on these grounds in Sibron v. 
New York,66  a companion case to Terry. Both Terry and Sibron came to 
the Supreme Court as appeals from trial court denials of motions to 
suppress.67 While introduction of the weapon uncovered from the frisk 
in Terry was admissible, the Sibron evidence was excluded on grounds 
that the search was not justified by the protective interest that 
motivated the officer in Terry. Sibron involved a police officer who 
searched Sibron after observing him “talking to a number of known 
addicts.”68 The Court noted that the Terry rule only justified limited 
frisks where particular facts support an inference of danger to the 
officer, which was not present based on an individual speaking with 
 
 64  William J. Stuntz, Terry and Substantive Law, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1362, 1362 (2012). 
 65  Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
 66  392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 67  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5; Sibron, 392 U.S. at 47–48. In Terry, the Court somewhat 
cryptically noted that its “approval of legitimate and restrained investigative conduct undertaken 
on the basis of ample factual justification should in no way discourage the employment of other 
remedies than the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may prove 
inappropriate.” 392 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). However, the Court did not itself suggest any 
alternate remedies. 
 68  Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62. 
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known addicts.69 The Court went further, distinguishing the Sibron 
search from the Terry search, which initially “consisted solely of a 
limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed 
objects,” with the officer “plac[ing] his hands in [Terry’s] pockets” only 
after “discover[ing] [a concealed] object.”70 
The Terry-Sibron comparison illuminates the Court’s concerns 
about individual dignity. In Terry, the Court justified its application of 
the Fourth Amendment to frisks (but not stops) because it found a frisk 
to be “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.”71 The Court 
addressed this intrusion by requiring a balancing between the level of 
intrusion and the level of suspicion. It could be the case that the harm 
to a person’s dignity from the intrusion of a frisk may be greater than 
the harm to dignity resulting from a full search incident to arrest. The 
reason may lie in the difference in the standard for a frisk versus a 
search: a full search incident to arrest requires probable cause, which 
suggests specific behavioral and inherently concrete indicia of 
suspicion. A frisk, in contrast, need only be justified by the more 
subjective and inchoate standards of reasonable suspicion. 
3. How much reasonable suspicion? What indicia? 
Both in the run-up to Terry and the decades after, courts never 
developed a constitutional consensus as to how much suspicion is 
needed to give rise to reasonable suspicion.72 Nor are there substantive 
indicia to prioritize or weigh which behaviors or factors matter; the 
courts have said only that these indicia must be reasonable. Some 
courts have argued for a test based on the efficacy of stops in detecting 
crime or locating contraband, but here too, there is no agreement on 
what constitutes an acceptable “hit rate” that satisfies the 
reasonableness standard across cases. In Navarette v. California,73 for 
example, Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that at least five, if not ten 
percent, of the entire universe of incidents would need to be an accurate 
“hit” to be indicative of reasonable suspicion. According to Scalia, 
 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. at 65. 
 71  Terry, 392 U.S. at 17; see also id. at 24–25 (“Even a limited search of the outer clothing for 
weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it 
must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”). 
 72  See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967) (“Unfortunately, there can be 
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against 
the invasion which the search entails.”); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the 
Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 58 (2015); 
Harcourt & Meares, supra note 63. 
 73  134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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absent such a showing, the basis of suspicion is not reasonable without 
further information.74 A similar outcomes test was considered in Floyd 
to claim that the police were so often wrong in the bases of suspicion for 
their stops that those bases were categorically faulty.75 
But after nearly five decades of Terry, courts have rejected a 
substantive review of the criteria of “reasonable suspicion.” Instead, 
courts have consistently decided cases based on some rendering of the 
reasoning of the officers at the scene (based on a post-hoc account) 
pursuant to a specific fact, and whether that reasoning was, well, 
reasonable to an experienced officer.76 But it gets worse. Until recently, 
a series of cases required that the basis of the information on which 
reasonable suspicion was determined be reliable.77 But in Navarette, 
the Court largely abandoned the reliability doctrine by holding that an 
anonymous 911 call without any corroboration meets a test of 
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and seizure.78 
Under the real-time demands of police work, and with little 
oversight to correct misapplication of the perceptual and reasoning 
processes, the articulation of suspicion often defaults to behavioral 
scripts that are matched to fill in the empty cognitive spaces in the 
actual bases of suspicion.79 In three out of four street stops in New York 
City, for example, police observe a suspect for less than two minutes 
before proceeding to what New York state law80 defines as an 
“intrusion.”81 The stop requires officers to perform a quick perceptual 
and cognitive sorting of complicated and highly contextualized 
information that shapes the initial evaluation of suspicion. As the 
interaction unfolds, this sorting is modified and narrowed through 
interactions and exchanges between the suspect and the officer(s). After 
 
 74  Id. at 1695. 
 75  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (pointing to 
the fact that “[t]he rate of arrests arising from stops is low . . . and the yield of seizures of guns or 
other contraband is even lower,” and noting “that the City’s attempt to account for the low rate of 
arrests and summonses following stops was not persuasive”). 
 76  Fagan & Geller, supra note 72. 
 77   See Steven Grossman, Whither Reasonable Suspicion: The Supreme Court’s Functional 
Abandonment of the Reasonableness Requirement for Fourth Amendment Seizures, 53 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 349, 350 (2016) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 
393 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964)). 
 78  Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686. 
 79  Fagan & Geller, supra note 72. 
 80  See People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571–72 (N.Y. 1976). In contrast to the two-stage 
inquiry developed in Terry, De Bour articulates four levels of suspicion correlated with four levels 
of justified intrusion. See also People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 205 (N.Y. 1992). Most states 
follow Terry. For example, Massachusetts follows constitutional Terry standards. See 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (2001). 
 81  Fagan Report, supra note 54. 
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all this, the officer then retreats to an unspecified location under 
uncertain conditions to record the reasons for the encounter, reasons 
that may have taken place and been cognitively encoded an hour or 
more before. 
It is no wonder that police officers may default to a script. But even 
with the handy crutch of a script, the cognitive burden to both 
articulate the reasons for the suspicion, and how those reasons got 
beyond a (not well articulated) threshold to take action, leaves a wide 
space for error in perceptions, weighing, and decision-making. 
The configuration of Terry and its progeny simply begs the 
question as to what factors meet the test of articulable and 
individualized. These cases continue, as did Terry itself, the fiction that 
there is a threshold of suspicion that renders police action 
constitutionally permissible. Suspicion in this formulation thus 
becomes a hurdle model, or a binary category, in which the stop is 
either constitutional or not.82 Courts worry more than the police about 
whether there is enough suspicion to get over that hurdle and satisfy 
the “individualized” suspicion test. And the elasticity of the Terry 
standards complicates the job of courts to regulate those decisions.83 
Officers are left to the extremes of roll call training on the one hand 
and litigation challenges on the other to define a space in which their 
actions comport with the shifting territory of the Fourth Amendment.84 
C. Terry’s Crime Control Agenda 
Terry’s original sin took two forms. First the majority created the 
reasonable suspicion standard that allowed subjective assessments of 
suspects’ behavior to substitute for the more demanding standard of 
probable cause. This was done, as discussed earlier, in the interest of 
protecting officers from harm. The Terry Court declined to articulate 
clear standards of suspicion, defaulting the professional “experience” 
and judgment of the officer.85 The second sinful act was the doctrinal 
shift over time from the original officer safety rationale to permitting 
reasonable suspicion stops in the interest of crime control. This section 
examines the evolution of this second sin, and describes the rationale 
for modern Terry practice. 
 
 82  See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 63. 
 83  See Meares, supra note 44, at 172–76. 
 84  See Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Making the “Law of the Land” the Law on the Street: How 
Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295, 319–31 (2000). 
 85  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (“We merely hold today that where a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot . . . .”). 
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1. Terry’s hidden crime control agenda. 
A first reading of the majority opinion in Terry suggests that it had 
little to do with crime control, and everything to do with the safety of 
police officers in conducting investigative stops or field interrogations.86 
The Court seemed to be well aware that it was making a trade-off: in 
allowing “something less than a ‘full’ search” at a new and relaxed 
standard of “reasonable suspicion,” the Court held that the Terry stop 
“must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons 
which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.”87 
At first glance then, the Terry Court’s concern seemed to be less 
about public safety generally, but rather the safety of the officer when 
approaching and questioning individuals like John Terry. The 
President’s 1965 Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice reported that “[c]ommission 
observers of police streetwork in high-crime neighborhoods of some 
large cities report that 10 percent of those frisked were found to be 
carrying guns, and another 10 percent were carrying knives.”88 But the 
report did not mention officer injuries or deaths in routine contacts as 
posing the danger that drove the Terry ruling.  
In fact, the only evidence the Terry Court cites about the dangers of 
policing is a reference to the same 1965 Presidential Commission and is 
contained in a footnote, worrying that frisks often exacerbate tensions 
between the police and minority groups.89 In the end, the Court does 
not tie the crime-control or officer-safety aspects of the opinion to any 
evidence. In the years between Mapp and Terry, officer deaths rose as 
overall rates of violent crime rose, but the Terry Court made no note of 
this.90 
 
 86  The Terry Court states specifically that, “[t]he sole justification of the search in the present 
situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby.” Id. at 29. (emphasis added). 
 87  Id. at 26. But see Steiker, supra note 35 (arguing the officer safety standard was extended 
four years after Terry in Adams v. Williams from the frisk to the stop, via a textual mashup of the 
facts of the Adams stop with the text of the Terry opinion). 
 88  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CHALLENGE OF CRIME 
IN A FREE SOCIETY 94–95 (1967), https: //www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https: //perma.cc / 
M6HY-RDPA]. 
 89  Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11. 
 90  In the years between Mapp and Terry, total officer deaths (not just those resulting from 
felony crimes by suspects) increased from 140 in 1961 to 191 in 1968. In the decade after Terry, as 
violent crime overall increased, officer deaths increased from 194 in 1969 to 215 in 1978, with a 
peak of 280 in 1974. See Officer Deaths by Year, NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL 
FUND, http: //www.nleomf.org /facts/officer-fatalities-data/year.html [https: //perma.cc /KU2E-5JYE] 
(including all officer deaths, not just officers killed by criminal suspects). Of the 1466 officers 
killed from 2005–14, 482 (32.9%) were killed in auto or motorcycle crashes, and 554 (37.6%) were 
killed by criminal suspects. The remainder died from a variety of natural or accidental causes. 
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But in fact, crime control and public safety were as much on the 
minds of the justices as was officer safety. Two concurring justices and 
a third dissenting justice more directly alluded to a general crime-
prevention rationale for the Terry holding than does the Court’s 
majority opinion. First, Justice Harlan, who rejected the Court’s effort 
to decouple the “frisk” issue from the “stop” issue, concurred to make 
clear that, to him, the stop was constitutional “only because 
circumstances warranted [the officer] forcing an encounter with Terry 
in an effort to prevent or investigate a crime.”91 Thus, for Justice 
Harlan, the intrusion of the stop and frisk needed the crime-prevention 
rationale to survive constitutional scrutiny. Although Justice Harlan 
described his opinion as merely “fill[ing] in a few gaps” in the majority 
opinion, the reference to preventing crime more broadly than the 
potential harm to the police officer conducting the frisk nowhere 
appears in the Court’s opinion.92 
Second, Justice White, in the second paragraph of his two-
paragraph concurrence, provides “an additional word . . . concerning 
the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop.”93 Like Justice 
Harlan, Justice White emphasizes the link between “temporary 
detention” and the frisk that the majority opinion sought to avoid. But 
he went further than Justice Harlan to speculate about a possible 
crime-prevention benefit of frisks that fail to uncover any weapons: 
“Perhaps the frisk itself, where proper, will have beneficial results 
whether questions are asked or not. If weapons are found, an arrest 
will follow. If none are found, the frisk may nevertheless serve 
preventive ends because of its unmistakable message that suspicion has 
been aroused.”94 The two concurrences bookend two different 
theoretical supports for investigative stops: while Justice Harlan 
appears to have identified the crime-prevention rationale based on 
police intervention before a crime is committed, Justice White 
apparently saw a general crime-prevention effect in the failure to 
 
Causes of Law Enforcement Deaths, NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL FUND, 
http: //www.nleomf.org /facts/officer-fatalities-data/causes.html [https: //perma.cc /Y6JM-NAL2].  
One writer calculated that felonious deaths of police officers averaged 62.8 per year from 1960–65, 
and rose to 76.6 in the four years surrounding the Terry opinion, again commensurate with an 
overall increase in violent crime. See Dan Wang, Data on Police Officers Killed Since 1961,  
DAN WANG (June 16, 2015), http: //danwang.co/statistics-on-police-fatalities/ [https: // 
perma.cc /V7S9-7U9R] (citing evidence from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports dating to 1961). 
 91  Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 92  Id. at 31. Justice Rehnquist continued this conflation of stop-and-frisk rationales in Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See also Steiker, supra note 35. 
 93  Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring). 
 94  Id. at 34–35 (emphasis added). 
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uncover weapons as a way to educate citizens about what police officers 
find suspicious. 
Justice Douglas dissented alone in Terry. He was implacable about 
the necessity of the probable cause requirement for a temporary 
detention and a frisk or pat down of a suspect.95 In passing, however, 
he acknowledged—noting the escalating crime rates in the years after 
Mapp—that “[p]erhaps [the Terry rule] is desirable to cope with modern 
forms of lawlessness.”96 This seems an oblique reference to a general 
crime-prevention rationale that goes beyond the narrower interest in 
officer safety enunciated by the majority.97 
In the few states that developed doctrine that differed from Terry, 
the controlling opinions also incorporated both crime control and officer 
safety prongs.98 In People v. De Bour,99 officer safety was a less pressing 
concern than was the broader public safety impetus for the pursuit and 
frisk of the suspect. The New York State Court of Appeals upheld the 
introduction into evidence of a gun discovered when police officers 
asked a man to unzip his jacket.100 The court held the encounter was a 
“legitimate . . . inquir[y] as to [De Bour’s] identity” because it was 
without “harassment or intimidation,” “brief,” involved prevention of the 
“serious crime” of narcotics, “occurred after midnight in an area known 
for its high incidence of drug activity,” and because “De Bour had 
conspicuously crossed the street.”101 
 
 95  The gravamen of his dissent is that the Constitution requires probable cause. See id. at 35 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 96  Id. at 38. 
 97  But Justice Douglas does not further discuss the issue, saying only that the Terry rule 
would be justified only by constitutional amendment, not by judicial decision. See id. at 39. 
 98  Most states follow Terry. For example, Massachusetts follows constitutional Terry 
standards. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Mass. 2001); see also 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 4 N.E.3d 1236, 1247 (Mass. 2014) (“[W]e ask whether the stop was 
based on an officer's reasonable suspicion that the person was committing, had committed, or was 
about to commit a crime.”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 801 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Mass. 2004) (“[That] 
suspicion must be grounded in ‘“specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences [drawn] 
therefrom” rather than on a “hunch.”’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 392 
(Mass. 1990) quoting Commonwealth v. Wren, 464 N.E.2d 344, 345 (Mass. 1984). 
 99  352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). 
 100  Id. at 570. De Bour and two police officers were walking toward each other just after 
midnight; when the officers and De Bour were within “30 or 40 feet of the uniformed officers,” De 
Bour crossed the street. Id. at 565. “The two policemen followed suit” and, upon meeting De Bour, 
one officer asked him what he was doing. “De Bour, clearly but nervously, answered that he had 
just parked his car and was going to a friend’s house.” The officer asked De Bour for identification; 
De Bour said he had none. One officer then “noticed a slight waist-high bulge in [De Bour’s] jacket 
[and] . . . asked De Bour to unzipper his coat. When De Bour complied . . . [the officer] observed a 
revolver protruding from [De Bour’s] waistband.” At a suppression hearing, De Bour testified that 
he had been patted down for “two or three minutes” before the gun was found; however, the trial 
court credited the officer’s testimony and the weapon was admitted into evidence. Id. 
 101  Id. at 570 (emphasis added). The court, in describing the encounter, held that “the 
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The crime control function of Terry stops is one of a number of 
governmental interests that could potentially authorize a stop, but case 
law after Terry focused increasingly narrowly on violations of criminal 
law as the primary government interest.102 For example, in United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,103 the Court extended the rationale and basis 
of Terry stops to a broader government interest: immigration control by 
roving patrol “to prevent the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican 
border” such that warrantless seizures, based on reasonable suspicion, 
could be used.104 In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,105 the Court found 
checkpoints within 100 miles of the border to be reasonable even 
without an element of suspicion in the stopping of cars.106 These border-
control searches could comfortably be described as crime control 
measures, and the Supreme Court accepts the governmental interest of 
preventing illegal immigration.107 
2. In plain sight: Terry’s explicit crime control strategy. 
After Adams v. Williams,108 which affirmed Terry while blurring 
the line between stops and protective frisks, the Court proceeded to 
incrementally extend the constitutionality of Terry stops beyond the 
narrow governmental interests of officer safety or border control, and, 
in so doing, affirmed its crime control rationale. In Michigan v. 
Summers,109 the Court extended Terry’s reach to investigative stops 
 
encounter did not subject De Bour to a loss of dignity.” 
 102  Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37 
(1967). In Brown v. Texas, the Court set out a three-pronged test to determine the constitutionality 
of Terry stops: “consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the 
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the 
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 
(1979). This three-part test is hardly ever accomplished. 
 103  422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 104  Id. at 879; see also id. at 878 (“As with other categories of police action subject to Fourth 
Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of such seizures depends on a balance between the 
public interest and the individual’s rights to personal security free from arbitrary interference by 
law officers.”). 
 105  428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 106  Id. at 567. The Court balanced the intrusion created by the checkpoint, evaluated to be 
considerably less than roving patrols, with the public interest in preventing illegal immigration. 
The Court also noted that requiring all checkpoint stops to be based on reasonable suspicion would 
be “impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of 
a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.” Id. at 557. 
 107  It may be more accurate to describe these border stops as investigative or detection-based: 
they seek to discover illegal aliens who have already crossed the border and the smugglers who aid 
them. The crimes of unauthorized entry and aiding unauthorized entry to the United States have 
thus already been committed. 
 108  407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 109  452 U.S. 692 (1981). 
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incident to a search warrant.110 Here, a division opened within the 
Court between those who would restrict Terry stops to the already 
authorized safety (or border control) exceptions and those who sought 
to extend Terry in favor of police action more closely in tune with a 
crime control perspective. The dissenters in Summers favored the 
narrower view. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, explained that “some governmental interest independent of 
the ordinary interest in investigating crime and apprehending 
suspects” must be important enough “to overcome the presumptive 
constitutional restraints on police conduct.”111 The majority, however, 
used the border-control-search cases to demonstrate 
that the exception for limited intrusions that may be justified by 
special law enforcement interests is not confined to the 
momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for 
weapons involved in Terry and Adams. . . . Most obvious is the 
legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the 
event that incriminating evidence is found. Less obvious, but 
sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing 
the risk of harm to the officers.112 
Over time, the Court further extended Terry’s subtext authorizing 
investigative stops as a crime-fighting tool, each time increasing the 
scope of their permissible contexts. For example, in Michigan v. 
Long,113 the Supreme Court held that seizure of non-weapon 
contraband during a weapons search of a vehicle did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.114 Minnesota v. Dickerson115 extended Long to 
contraband found by touch during a pat down for weapons.116 And a 
further extension of the weapons search rationale came in Maryland v. 
Buie,117 where the Court authorized a “protective sweep” of an 
 
 110  Id. at 705. 
 111  Id. at 707. 
 112  Id. at 700–02 (emphasis added). “In assessing the justification for the detention of an 
occupant of premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant, both the law 
enforcement interest and the nature of the ‘articulable facts’ supporting the detention are 
relevant.” Id. at 702–03 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 113  463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 114  Id. at 1050. 
 115  508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
 116  Id. at 378–79. The seizure in that case was unlawful because, although the search was 
authorized, the officer squeezed and manipulated the contraband after concluding that it was not 
a weapon. It was therefore unrelated to the search for weapons and “amounted to the sort of 
evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize.” 
 117  494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
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individual’s house where he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. In 
Hayes v. Florida,118 the Court authorized, in principle, officers in the 
field to take fingerprints incidental to Terry stops if the officers had a 
reasonable suspicion that the individual had committed a crime.119 
The final stages of Terry’s expansion to crime control are evident in 
the pretextual stop authorized in Whren v. United States,120 which 
permits an investigative stop and search once an officer has probable 
cause to believe that any crime has occurred, no matter how trivial.121 
In that case, the Court not only refused to take into account the 
subjective motivation of the narcotics officers (who had used a traffic 
infraction as a pretext to stop suspected drug traffickers); it also 
refused to consider the argument that an objectively reasonable officer, 
“acting reasonably,” would not have made the stop “for the reason 
given.”122 Nor did the Whren Court consider the racial lopsidedness of 
the incorporation of Terry stops in the practices cited in Whren.123 And 
in Illinois v. Wardlow124 a suspect’s presence in a “high crime area” was 
validated as a multiplier of less salient factors into actionable 
suspicion, including facially subjective rationales such as furtive 
movements or other criminal appearances.125 Yet, neither the Wardlow 
majority nor any subsequent cases attempted to standardize the 
parameters of a “high crime area,” completing the subjectivization of 
what Terry had launched three decades earlier.126 Judge Alex Kozinski, 
dissenting in United States v. Montero-Camargo127 summed up the 
Wardlow challenge in the same year: “Just as a man with a hammer 
 
 118  470 U.S. 811 (1985). 
 119  Id. at 817. The Court placed limits on the procedure, ruling that fingerprinting must be 
“carried out with dispatch” and there must be “a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting 
will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime.” Id. 
 120  517 U.S. 806 (1996).   
 121  For a discussion of the racial implications of Whren, see Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial 
Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1073 (2010). See also Kevin 
R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United States: The Song Remains the Same, in RACE LAW 
STORIES (Devon Carbado & Rachel F. Moran eds., 2006). 
 122  Whren, 517 U.S. at 814. 
 123  When the petitioners in Whren introduced evidence showing that a stop for a civil traffic 
violation—an expression of those non-criminal governmental interests that were foundational to 
the evolution of Terry doctrine—was in fact a pretextual, race-based stop to look for drugs, the 
Court thought those concerns to be beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 813. The 
Whren Court failed to distinguish what was outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment—the 
pretextual stop or the racial imbalance—in its application at the time. 
 124  528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 125  Id. at 124. 
 126  Cf. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 17 (arguing that courts should use objective, 
quantifiable measures to determine what qualifies as a “high-crime area”). 
 127  208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every 
corner of his beat as a high crime area.”128 
3. Modern Terry doctrine. 
This trajectory of cases suggests then that from the initially 
delimited weapons search in Terry, intended to protect police, the Court 
has thus extended the reasons for which Terry stops may be conducted 
well beyond its original boundary: law enforcement can use Terry stops 
to investigate future, ongoing and past crimes; to check identity, even 
through fingerprinting; to search a car for identification; to search 
residences for contraband and weapons; and to search luggage, 
regardless of the presence of the owner.129 By 1986, the Court had 
stopped discussing the government’s justification for a stop-and-search 
in terms of broader government interest or of officer safety. By that 
year, for example, the most detailed articulations of the crime control 
functions of a Terry stop were general statements such as that in Terry 
itself: “effective crime prevention and detection.”130 Or, as in United 
States v. Hensley:131 “solving crimes and bringing offenders to 
justice.”132 Or, as in Florida v. Royer:133 questioning related to “the 
 
 128  Id. at 1143 (Kosinzki, J., dissenting). Judge Kosinzki further explains: 
Does an arrest every four months or so make for a high crime area? . . . [T]o rely on every 
cop’s repertoire of war stories to determine what is a ‘high crime area’—and on that basis 
to treat otherwise innocuous behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion—strikes me 
as an invitation to trouble. If the testimony of two officers that they made, at most, 32 
arrests during the course of a decade is sufficient to turn the road here into a high crime 
area, then what area under police surveillance wouldn’t qualify as one? . . . I would be 
most reluctant to give police the power to turn any area into a high crime area based on 
their unadorned personal experiences. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 129  See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: FIXING POLICING IN AMERICA (forthcoming 
2017) (on file with author). 
 130  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 
 131  469 U.S. 221 (1985). 
 132  Id. at 229. The Hensley Court found law enforcement interests outweighed the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment protection, even for past crimes: 
[W]here police have been unable to locate a person suspected of involvement in a past 
crime, the ability to briefly stop that person, ask questions, or check identification in the 
absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and 
bringing offenders to justice. Restraining police action until after probable cause is 
obtained would not only hinder the investigation, but might also enable the suspect to 
flee in the interim and to remain at large. Particularly in the context of felonies or 
crimes involving a threat to public safety, it is in the public interest that the crime be 
solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible. 
Id. 
 133  460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
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suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious 
crime.”134 Finally, in Floyd v. City of New York, the trial court noted 
that the conduct of Terry stops as part of a crime control “program,”135 
suggestive of what Justice Marshall in Florida v. Bostick136 called a 
“dragnet,”137 violated the original intent of Terry: to conduct 
investigative stops to identify imminent or ongoing crimes based on 
articulable bases of suspicion. 
The most recent expansion of Terry’s doctrine was actually not 
about the parameters of suspicion, but addressed the Fourth 
Amendment regulation of those boundaries, and whether a violation of 
reasonable suspicion can even trigger Fourth Amendment relief. In 
Utah v. Strieff,138 the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not 
apply to evidence discovered after an unlawful stop that turned up an 
outstanding arrest warrant. The most important feature of the Court’s 
opinion was its admission of evidence that was obtained by plainly 
unconstitutional conduct. Officer James Fackrell stopped Edward 
Strieff as he was leaving a residence that Fackrell believed was a drug 
selling location.139 “Over the course of about a week, Officer Fackrell 
conducted intermittent surveillance of the home. He observed visitors 
who left a few minutes after arriving there. These visits were 
sufficiently frequent to raise his suspicion that the occupants were 
 
 134  Id. at 499. 
 135  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 600–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also 
Meares, supra note 44. Indeed, the use of Terry stops or investigative stops as a crime control 
program had a long history that predated Terry. Stop-and-frisk tactics were used 
programmatically in the 1960s as crime rates increased, and were targeted in poor minority 
neighborhoods where they became important contributors to urban unrest. See, KERNER COMM’N, 
supra note 22; see also Robert M. Fogelson, From Resentment to Confrontation: The Police, the 
Negroes, and the Outbreak of the Nineteen-Sixties Riots, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 217, 217–18 (1968) 
(linking the urban riots in the 1960s to a string of “extraordinary and unjustified police actions”). 
 136  501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 137  Id. at 441 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The broad range of modern searches under Terry’s 
crime control rationale, including programs like stop and frisk in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, 
and Philadelphia, and a wide range of administrative searches including checkpoints and school 
sweeps, all express the crime control and deterrence rationales that were incubated in Terry and 
developed over the next five decades. These developments all were done without democratic 
regulation or political processes. See, e.g., DAVID SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008) 
(arguing that the democratization of the police, not regulation by courts, will produce more 
effective and accountable policing); Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
761, 777 (2012) (emphasizing that constitutional law cannot fully address problems of police 
regulation); Carl McGowan, Rule-making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1974) (arguing 
that police departments, not courts, should formulate rules to govern policing); Christopher 
Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Non-delegation Doctrine, 102 
GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014) (arguing that ordinary democratic processes of legislative authorization and 
police rulemaking should govern panvasive searches and seizures). 
 138  136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) 
 139  Id. at 2060. 
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dealing drugs.”140 Fackrell’s conclusions about the illegal activity at 
that spot were based on an anonymous call to a “drug-tip line” and 
Fackrell’s own personal experience.141 Once stopped, Fackrell 
discovered that Strieff had a “small” outstanding arrest warrant for a 
traffic violation.142 Conducting a search incident to arrest, Fackrell 
discovered drug paraphernalia and amphetamine in Strieff ’s pockets. 
The Strieff Court recognized that the stop was unconstitutional.143  
So did the Utah Supreme Court, which had nullified the arrest on the 
drug charges.144 But, because that conduct was (in the eyes of the 
Court) neither intentional nor flagrant, the evidence was admitted. 
Applying an attenuation doctrine that severed the police conduct from 
the causal chain between the stop and the seizure, the evidence was 
allowed to stand. The decision seems to go in two directions at once. 
The Court recognized that the discovery of the warrant was 
unforeseeable: there are no behavioral indicia that someone may have 
an outstanding warrant, nor was that condition noted in prior cases as 
a sign, as the Terry Court required, that “crime is afoot.”145 But the 
Court also wanted to allow the reasonableness of the stop and warrant 
check, despite the fact that the discovery of an outstanding warrant 
was unforeseeable. It is rare, except in extraordinary circumstances as 
in the Ferguson investigation,146 to discover an outstanding warrant 
during a routine pedestrian or traffic stop.147 In dissent, Justice 
Sotomayor characterized the warrant check as “part and parcel of the 
officer’s illegal ‘expedition for evidence in the hope that something 
might turn up.’”148 Perhaps most important, the attenuation doctrine 
applied by the Strieff Court essentially scrubs out reasonableness from 
the Terry formula. 
 
 140  Id. at 2059. 
 141  Id. 
 142  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 143  136 S. Ct. at 2061. 
 144  357 P. 3d at 544. 
 145  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) 
 146  U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 47, 55 (2015), https: //www.justice.gov/sites/default /files/opa/press-releases/ 
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https: //perma.cc /8QX8-JMCN]. 
 147  Brief of Dr. Ian Ayres et al. in Support of Petitioner, Petition for Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at 6–8, United States v. Faulkner, 636 F.3d 1009 
(8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-235), 2011 WL 4479100, at *6–8. 
 148  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–05 (1975)). 
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Justice Sotomayor goes further, claiming that this is hardly an 
“isolated” event that the Strieff majority claims.149 She describes the 
same decades of expansion of the Terry logic to justify widespread 
investigative stops of both pedestrians and vehicles,150 and the risks of 
humiliating intrusions and abuses during these now routine contacts.151 
She goes on to describe the racial skew in the risks of these contacts, 
describing a “double consciousness” of race and criminality that is 
instantiated in black and Latino youths.152 
D. Gains and Losses After Terry 
The majority of opinions of the courts in the stop-and-frisk cases 
that followed Terry, as well as recent legal scholarship, argue, “Terry’s 
regime of stop-and-frisk may well be critical to the fight against violent 
crime. For that reason, the law enforcement benefits of Terry seem 
substantial, and the intrusion on liberty that it authorizes seems 
relatively limited.”153 Yet there has been remarkably little empirical 
analysis of Terry’s crime control contributions. This crime control 
agenda, and its claims of efficacy in reducing crime, provides the 
rationale then to test Terry’s effects on crime. 
This essay starts with the notion that, searching for a crime control 
rationale to justify a broad standard for police intrusions via street 
stops, Terry’s original sin was forgoing a probable cause standard for 
investigative stops and substituting an inchoate standard, a standard 
that is inherently subjective and prone to cognitive distortion, bias and 
error. Somewhere between that elastic Terry standard in practice 
today—a practice that often instantiates into policy and program the 
hunches that so worried the Terry Court—and Mapp’s probable cause 
standard, lies a threshold of suspicion that can do three things: avoid 
the petty indignities that have become commonplace in the “new 
policing,”154 avoid the burdens on the innocents of inefficient stops and 
intrusions that consume both police resources and citizen trust,155 and 
 
 149  Id. at 2068–69. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. at 2069–71. 
 152  Id.; see also I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 44 
(2009). 
 153  See Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race and the Case against Terry v. 
Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 329–30 (2010). However, the intrusions may be anything but 
“relatively limited.” 
 154  See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness and the Unrecognized 
Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1013–14 (2014); see generally Phillip B. 
Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (2000). 
 155  See Stuntz, supra note 42. 
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contribute substantially to Terry’s crime control agenda. The empirical 
data in this paper seek out that threshold. 
III. EMPIRICAL DETAILS 
A. Data and Measures 
 
Data produced in the litigation in Floyd v. City of New York were 
re-analyzed to address these questions.156 The study period was 2004 
though 2012, a lengthy interval to examine trends by month that were 
sensitive to changes in police stop-and-frisk practices. The data 
included geocoded records of each stop, which were aggregated to 
generate counts of stops within police precincts and census block 
groups for each month.157 The stop data also included police reports of 
the crime suspected in each stop. These included 133 codes that were 
reduced to seven categories that reflected the crime categories of 
interest in the policy debate in New York on the stop regime.158 Crime 
counts were estimated from crimes reported to the police and geocoded 
to the nearest street block. These crime reports were then aggregated 
to generate counts of suspected crimes within precincts and census 
block groups for each month. The rationales for these units of analysis 
are discussed infra. The classification categories are shown in Appendix 
A. 
Census data from the 2008 American Community Survey (the 
midpoint of the time series) were used to generate an empirical 
description of the social, economic, and demographic conditions for each 
census block. Although the use of a single time point omits changes in 
the economic and demographic characteristics of these census blocks 
during the time-period, only a small portion of the 6475 census block 
groups were changing dynamically during this interval. I address the 
effects that temporal trends in areas could have on my estimates by 
including a linear time trend for each police precinct-month. Precincts 
are administrative units encompassing census block groups and are 
 
 156  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). As part of discovery in the 
litigation, data were provided to plaintiffs on stops, crimes, and arrests for each year in the study 
period. 
 157  Census block groups are small statistical and spatial divisions of census tracts. They range 
in size from 600 to 3000 persons. Block groups cover contiguous areas, and are always located 
within a census tract (never crossing tract boundaries). The boundaries are defined by streets or 
highways, railroads, streams, and other bodies of water, and/or other visible physical and cultural 
features. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS-BLOCK GROUPS, 
https: //www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc /gtc_bg.html [https: //perma.cc /2EPJ-TQCY]. 
 158  See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 580–81; see also Fagan Report, supra note 54; Fagan 
Supplemental Report, supra note 54. 
68               THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM    [2016 
 
substantively important, as this is the spatial unit where uniformed 
police officers are assigned, and crime control strategies are 
implemented and managed. 
The nine law-defined categories of suspicion that police marked on 
each stop form were used to state the bases of reasonable suspicion for 
each stop.159 The boxes included affirmative stop rationales plus an 
option to check “other” and record the specifics by hand.160 The nine 
rationales incorporated a set of behavioral categories based on both 
state and federal case law that would survive a Fourth Amendment 
test for the individualized stop rationales.161 Officers could check as 
many boxes as needed to express the basis for the stop. Table 1 lists the 
categories available for officers to mark the bases of suspicion. In about 
ninety-five percent of the stops from 2004–2012, officers checked from 
one to six factors, creating 60,459 possible combinations that express 
the bases of suspicion for this subset. 
 
Table 1. Specific Stop Circumstances and Percent 
Based on Each Factor 
Factor 
% of 
Stops 
Furtive Movements 54.9% 
Casing 28.8% 
Other Stop Circumstance 20.2% 
Evasive Actions 17.1% 
Fits Description 17.0% 
Carrying Crime Objects in Plain View 12.7% 
Drug Transaction 9.3% 
Suspicious Bulge 8.9% 
Actions Indicate Violent Crime 8.0% 
N= 4,575,787 
Note: The total exceeds 100 percent due to multiple 
stop factors indicated per incident.  
Source: NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Database, various years. 
 
Three of the nine factors describe observable suspect behaviors 
that approximate criminal activity: (1) actions indicative of engaging in 
 
 159  See Fagan Report, supra note 54, at 22. The checkboxes were incorporated into the 
standard reporting form for stops, the UF-250. They were a set of indicia of suspicion derived from 
the aggregate experiences of officers who had been conducting stops over many years. See id. at 
48–49. 
 160  Id. at 22. 
 161  See id. at Appendix F; see also Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No. 10 Civ. 0699) (hereinafter Fagan Davis Report); Fagan & Geller, supra note 72. 
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drug transaction, (2) actions indicative of violent crimes, or (3) “casing” 
victim or location.162 These factors on their face approximated a 
probable cause basis for a Terry stop. Each factor is narrow and 
behaviorally specific, avoiding the vagueness and subjectivity that 
worried the Terry Court163 and that has translated into recurring 
constitutional challenges based on Fourth Amendment violations.164 We 
have only vague ideas about how police discretion is managed in 
deciding who to stop, and even less information on what exactly they 
are looking for when they think an action or person looks suspicious.165 
While there may be no algorithm to explain how police determinations 
of suspicious behavior are formed, there are at least observable 
patterns. The worry in this regime is about unconscious patterns, often 
racialized, that shape the formation of suspicion based on archetypes 
such as the “symbolic assailant” and other processes that shape 
cognition and interpretation of behavioral cues.166 Symbolic cues are 
clearly problematic, as they have no legal justification. 
Judicial opinions make clear that stops based on observations of 
actions indicative of criminal behavior are constitutional. Actions 
indicative of a drug transaction that can survive a prima facie claim of 
probable cause include observed exchange of currency or an object that 
might contain drugs.167 Some case law suggests that these actions are 
 
 162  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968) (upholding stop and frisk when officer 
suspected three men of casing a store in preparation for a daytime robbery); United States v. 
Padilla, 548 F.3d 179, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a detective’s observation of two men 
quietly following another individual into a secluded area in the dark and out of the individual’s 
peripheral vision “supported the detective’s suspicion that the two men might have been targeting 
the disheveled man for a robbery” and justified a stop and frisk); People v. Richard, 668 N.Y.S.2d 
386, 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“Reasonable suspicion supporting the forcible detention of 
defendant was supplied by lengthy police observations of defendant’s complex, unusual, and 
suspicious pattern of ‘casing’-type behavior, strongly suggestive of a known series of armed 
robberies in the neighborhood that targeted movie theaters in particular, coupled with the fact 
that defendant met a general description of one of the robbers.”). 
 163  See Stuntz, supra note 42. In Brown v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas’s 
stop-and-identify law as violating the Fourth Amendment because it allowed police officers to stop 
individuals without “reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved 
in criminal activity.” 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); see also Fagan & Geller, supra note 72. 
 164  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 165  See William H. Simon, Rethinking Privacy, BOSTON REV. (Oct. 20, 2014), https: //boston 
review.net /books-ideas/william-simon-rethinking-privacy-surveillance [https: //perma.cc /X6GD-
F2EP]. 
 166  Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance 
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 802 (1999); see also Fagan & Geller, supra note 72. 
 167  See, e.g., People v. Sierra, 683 N.E.2d 955, 956 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that officers had 
reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect calling “over here, over here” in an area known for drug 
trafficking who subsequently fled upon noticing the officers). But see People v. Thompson, No. 
2002-1635, 2004 LEXIS 873 (N.Y. App. Div. June 9, 2004) (holding that an officer did not have the 
authority to request that a suspect reveal what was in his hand because the suspect engaged in 
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indicia of criminal drug transactions only if they take place in a “drug-
prone” location, although courts have never clarified the meaning of a 
“drug-prone” location.168 For example, the Strieff Court questioned the 
formation of suspicion by Officer Fackrell that a particular residence 
was a “drug location” based on an anonymous tip to a “drug-tip” line 
about “narcotics activity at a particular residence.”169 Other courts have 
ruled that a suspected drug transaction with specific behavioral indicia 
may justify a field interrogation but, absent other factors, cannot justify 
a frisk.170 
Although “casing” can describe a number of different and 
potentially innocuous behaviors, actions legitimately indicative of 
casing either a victim or a location can justify a stop and frisk.171 
Reasonable suspicion that a person may have been involved in a violent 
crime can support a stop and frisk, even without other evidence of 
actual violent or otherwise dangerous behavior.172 So too can threats of 
 
“some sort of exchange” in a drug prone location). 
 168  See, e.g., People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 835, 837 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that a transaction that 
(a) involved the exchange of currency, (b) took place in a drug-prone location, and (c) was observed 
by an experienced officer who was trained in the investigation and detection of narcotics, 
supported a finding of probable cause). 
 169  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016) (disputing the reasonableness of Officer 
Fackrell’s seizure of Edward Strieff based on his presence at a location where Fackrell suspected 
that drugs were being sold). 
 170  Despite the purported link between guns and drugs that the Court assumed in this case, 
the fact that a suspect might have participated in a drug transaction does not instantly ensure 
that an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect has committed a crime and a 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed or dangerous. But compare People v. Perolta-Rua, 
579 N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that experienced officer’s knowledge “that 
drug dealers often carry weapons” was one factor supporting stop and frisk), with United States v. 
Gonzalez, 362 F. Supp. 415, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (deciding, under New York law, that stop and 
frisk was improper because “[n]one of the agents who testified expressed any concern that Torres 
might be armed and dangerous, and it is evident, even from their own testimony, that they 
grabbed his paper bag because they hoped to find narcotics, not a weapon”). 
 171  See Ohio v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), aff ’d, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In the 
original stop of John Terry, Officer Martin McFadden observed Terry and Richard Chilton, pacing 
back and forth in front of a jewelry store in Cleveland’s commercial district for twelve minutes 
before closing time. When Terry and Chilton were joined by a third man, Officer McFadden began 
a field interrogation. Terry’s mumbled responses further raised McFadden’s suspicion and led to a 
pat down and then search of Terry’s clothing that produced a loaded automatic gun. The Terry 
Court celebrated Officer McFadden’s experience as sharpening his ability to distinguish innocuous 
behavior from his decision that crime was “afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968). 
 172  See People v. Mack, 258 N.E.2d 703, 707 (N.Y. 1970) (“Where . . . the officer confronts an 
individual whom he reasonably suspects has committed, is committing or is about to commit such 
a serious and violent crime as robbery or, as in the instant case, burglary, then it is our opinion 
that that suspicion not only justifies the detention but also the frisk, thus making it unnecessary 
to particularize an independent source for the belief of danger.”); see also People v. Schollin, 682 
N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (upholding pat down of suspect when officer believed that 
victim had been shot in face); People v. Paul, 658 N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) 
(upholding stop and frisk where officers heard numerous gunshots and saw two persons running 
from location where shots were fired). 
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violence.173 Still, actions short of behavioral indicia of imminent or 
ongoing violence run the risk of vague and subjective interpretation by 
police contemplating a stop, and courts have urged caution in making 
the leap from “furtive movements” or “evasive actions” to violent 
crime.174 
The behavioral grounding of these three categories provides little 
room for cognitive error or perceptual distortion, and is consistent with 
state and federal case law on probable cause.175 In addition, courts have 
said that observed criminal behavior is sufficient on its own to justify a 
police stop.176 In contrast, the other six categories of suspicion in these 
data require subjective judgments and attributions of intent: (1) furtive 
movements, (2) fits descriptions, (3) carrying objects in plain view, (4) 
suspicious bulge, (5) evasive actions, or (6) “other.”177 In contrast to 
observations of specific criminal activity, these factors are vulnerable to 
cognitive bias and error, as well as racialized attributions of suspicion 
or criminality.178 
 
 173  See People v. Mitchell, 601 N.Y.S.2d 100, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (upholding search of 
suspect’s suitcase when woman told officers that suspect had verbally threatened to shoot her with 
shotgun). 
 174  See People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (finding that police had 
no reasonable suspicion to frisk suspect who repeatedly looked up and down the street and down 
subway stairs at 10:00 P.M. in high-crime area and who had reached into his jacket several times); 
see also People v. Alvarez, 778 N.Y.S.2d 27, 27–28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (finding that pat down 
was proper where, inter alia, police responded to radio call based on anonymous tip, heard 
suspicious noises coming from apartment, and witnessed suspect attempting to flee scene by 
climbing a fence. Given the vagueness of this standard, it is impossible to say whether a “sight” or 
“sound,” standing alone, would justify a stop and frisk.). 
 175  Fagan Report, supra note 54, at 40–53. 
 176  See Opinion and Order, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 08 Civ. 1034), at 579–80. 
 177  Fagan & Geller, supra note 72. “Other” stop factors were checked off at frequencies that 
varied by type of suspected crime. The content of the text strings that accompanied this factor was 
analyzed as part of expert reports in litigation. See Fagan Supplemental Report, supra note 54. 
The text strings for the “other” factor were a diverse set of observations that were at times specific 
(e.g., “smell of marijuana smoke”) and at times bizarrely vague (e.g., “looks like a perp”). See 
Fagan Davis Report, supra note 161. There was no discernable pattern that would sustain 
meaningful disaggregation or classification. When applied to judgments about the constitutional 
sufficiency of a stop event, they were far more likely to lead to a conclusion of “indeterminate” or 
“insufficient.” 
 178  See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren’t What They Seem: Context and Cognition 
in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97, 99–102 (2012); see also Geoffrey P. 
Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making during Citizen Stops, 43 
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 422–23 (2005) (showing that whether a suspect is black influences an officer’s 
decision to form suspicion based on non-behavioral versus behavioral cues); Adam M. Samaha, 
Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1620–34 (2012) (describing the 
New York stop-and-frisk regime as “appearance-based” regulation based on perceptions of 
disorderly places or people); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 
330–34 (2004) (showing empirically that perception of disorder in neighborhoods is correlated not 
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By hiving off the three categories of suspicion that are closer in 
meaning to a probable cause standard, the empirical strategy here is to 
determine how the use of these three categories of stops influences 
crime rates, net of other social and crime conditions. I estimate the 
number of probable and non-probable cause stops in each census block 
group each month to assess their separate and combined effects on 
crimes in later months. 
B. Empirical Strategy 
All statistical models were estimated as Poisson regressions with 
standard errors clustered by block groups to control for unmeasured 
variation and correlation within block groups.179 The regressions 
include a measure of the total stop, question, and frisk activity (SQF ) 
per month and a measure of the subset of stops based on “probable 
cause” justifications. A separate parameter for each month-precinct is 
included to control for separate trends within the larger precinct units 
in which block groups are nested.  Precincts are relevant as the 
management unit to supervise officers and deploy them to locales 
within the precincts. Assignments of officers change each month within 
precincts, if not more frequently, based on decisions made by precinct 
commanders. 
The model takes the form: 
(1) Yi,b,t = µi + λp,(i),t + β1Di p t + β2Pi + β3Si+ β4D*Pit + β5D*Si + β6X + 
εi,p,t 
where Yi,b,t  is the number of crimes in block group i located in 
precinct p in month t, λp(i),t is a measure of the crime rate in the block 
group the month before, D measures the number of stop factors 
indicated in stops, P measures the percent of probable cause stops, and 
S measures the total number of stops made in the block group in a 
month. For this model the parameter (β3) for S is constrained to equal 
one, so that P and D become rates per overall stop in each block 
month.180 The regression model also includes a time trend for the 
month-precinct. An interaction (D*P) between the number of probable 
cause stops and the average total of stop factors indicated in each stop 
is also included.  
 
only with observation of disorder but also with the racial composition of the neighborhood). 
 179  Richard A. Berk & John M. MacDonald, Overdispersion and Poisson Regression, 
24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 269, 271–72 (2008). 
 180  John M. MacDonald & Pamela K. Lattimore, Count Models in Criminology, in HANDBOOK 
OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY (Alex R. Piquero & David Weisburd eds., 2010). 
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In this model, X represents a set of control variables measuring 
local social conditions, including racial composition (percent black, 
percent Hispanic), poverty, age structure, immigrant concentration, 
average educational attainment, and the housing vacancy rate. These 
are measured for the midpoint of the time series, 2009, using census 
data from the American Community Survey’s five-year estimates.181 I 
also control for block groups in low-crime and low-population business 
districts, where cues of suspicion leading to stops may be more likely to 
be formed based on observations of individuals’ behaviors and not 
priming from the local neighborhood context.182 
The initial specifications estimate effects with lags of two months 
and leads of two months. This empirical strategy allows me to estimate 
the effects of stops net of the threats of reverse causation. The forward 
lag, or lead, tests the sensitivity of the results against spuriousness 
owing to temporal order183 or the possibility of regression to the 
mean.184 Blocks may receive an increase in overall stops due to a recent 
crime spike, so that mean reversion would lead to upwardly biased 
estimates in the regressions of monthly crime rates. To test for residual 
effects of stops on crime over a longer time-period the models are also 
estimated with six-month leads and lags. 
IV. RESULTS 
There are 6,495 census block groups in New York City, as of the 
2010 decennial census.185 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the 
city’s block groups. The average residential population is 1,348.9 
persons located in land areas averaging 0.047 square miles.186 The 
racial and ethnic population characteristics suggest the diversity of the 
city’s population, with percent Non-Hispanic white, Non-Hispanic 
black, and Hispanic populations nearly equally distributed. Non- 
 
 181  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA RELEASES (2009) 
https: //www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/news/data-releases.2009.html 
[https: //perma.cc /Y9MF-N2BT]. 
 182  See Fagan Report, supra note 54, at Tables 7 and 8 for examples of the sensitivity of 
estimates of Terry stop patterns when controlling for these non-residential local conditions. 
 183  See, e.g., Christopher Wildemann, Paternal Incarceration and Children’s Physically 
Aggressive Behaviors: Evidence from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, 89 SOC. 
FORCES 285, 293 (2010). 
 184  See Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to 
Estimate the Effect of Training Programs, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 648 (1985). 
 185  Census 2010, SOCIAL EXPLORER, http: //www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C2010/R11091839 
[https: //perma.cc /YP2W-83VC]. 
 186  The standard deviation for the land area is .738 square miles with a median size of .025 
square miles, indicating a wide range of sizes and densities of census block groups. Many of the 
larger block groups are commercial or industrial areas with very low populations. 
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Table 2.  Block Group Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Total Population  1348.9   625.5 
   
Racial and Ethnic Composition   
% White NH  44.6   31.2  
% Black NH  25.1   31.0  
% Hispanic  27.5   26.7  
% Other NH  11.8   17.5  
    Highest Education 
% > High School Grads 29.5 20.9 
% College Degree +  36.8   22.4  
    Housing 
   Vacancy Rate  9.1   8.2  
    Income and Poverty 
  % Public Assistance  5.1   6.1  
% Below Poverty  21.6   15.6  
Per Capita Income ($)  30,717.5   27,815.4  
    Stops 
   Stops per Month  4.1   9.3  
PC Stops per Month  1.7   4.4  
    Crime per Month 
  Violent - Felony 1.1 1.7 
Property - Felony 0.8 1.6 
Drug Crimes 0.4 1.0 
Other - Felony 0.06 0.3 
Weapons 
 
0.1 0.4 
Misdemeanors 2.2 3.5 
Violations 
 
0.6 1.1 
N of Block Groups 6475  
Source: American Community Survey, 2006-10 Estimates;  
New York City Police Department, Crime Complaints, various years;  
New York City Police Department, Stop and Frisk Data, various years. 
 
Hispanic whites are a plurality at 33.3%. Asians comprise 12.6% of the 
city’s population, the majority of the “Other Race” group of 15.3%. More 
than one in three adults over the age of twenty-five has a college degree 
or post-graduate study, and about one in five (22.4%) did not graduate 
from high school. One in five (21.6%) households live below the 
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federally defined poverty threshold. Median per-capita income is 
$30,718 per year. The housing vacancy rate, a correlate of crime,187 
averages 9.1% of total housing units in the block group. 
 Indicia of crime and enforcement also show considerable range and 
skew by census block group. Monthly crime counts appear low at first 
glance, but when aggregated across census block groups each month, 
the crime counts add up. The standard deviations again show the skew 
in these crime counts. Terry stops per month average 4.1 stops, with a 
standard deviation of 9.3. Of those stops, about half (46.1%) fit the 
definition of “probable cause” stops (hereinafter PC stops), with a 
standard deviation of 4.4. Figure 1 shows the distribution of PC and 
“non-probable cause” stops (hereafter NPC stops) per month over the 
nine-year period. PC stops were less frequent than NPC stops for 
nearly every month in the time series until May 2012. In that month, 
the counts of PC and NPC stops evened out, and the total number of 
stops declined sharply. The onset of the decline coincided with a class 
certification ruling in the Floyd litigation that allowed the litigation to 
proceed to trial.188 
 
 187  See Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and 
Urban Crime, 75 SOC. FORCES 619, 634 (1996); see also Lin Cui & Randall Walsh, Foreclosure, 
Vacancy and Crime, 87 J. URB. ECON. 72, 75 (2015). 
 188  See Opinion and Order, supra note 176 (ruling that plaintiffs satisfied the standards for 
class certification under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy) (citing Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. 
Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
76               THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM    [2016 
 
The specific stop circumstances that officers mark down for each 
stop were shown earlier in Table 1. Of the 46.1% that are classified as 
PC stops, more than half are based on suspicion of “casing,” the same 
circumstance that animated the 1963 stop of John Terry.189 A judgment 
that a suspect is casing a person or a location requires a subjective 
assessment and interpretations of specific behaviors that may be 
precursors of a crime. Of the three categories of PC stops, this is the 
most subjective. Suspicion under this category that rises to the level of 
action by an officer should require a lengthy period of police  
observation of the suspect or suspects in order to rule out innocent or 
casual actions and to show that the behavior is sustained over more 
than just a few minutes. The judgment requires more cognitive work 
than do judgments based on the other categories, where the behaviors 
may be more repetitive across events and circumstances, and where the 
actions and gestures are less ambiguous.190 And that cognitive work 
also can offset implicit biases in perception that can infect 
instantaneous or snap judgments of suspect actions, biases based on 
place, race, or archetypes such as the symbolic assailant.191 In contrast, 
“furtive movements,” marked as the basis of suspicion in movements, 
comprise half of the police stops in 2004–12, and represent the most 
vague and subjective indicia of suspicion.192 
Next, Table 3 reports the results of regressions showing the effects 
of PC stops on crime. Two different model specifications regressions 
were estimated. The first analyzed the effects of PC stops alone on six 
different types of crime, with total number of both PC and NPC stops 
as a control variable. The second version analyzed the effects of PC 
stops controlling not only for the total number of stops, but also 
including a measure of the average number of indicia of suspicion 
marked in the stops conducted in each block group-month observation. 
 
 189  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968). 
 190  As in money changing hands. 
 191  See, e.g., Fagan & Geller, supra note 72; Samaha, supra note 178; Sampson & Raudenbush, 
supra note 178. 
 192  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 8, 11, 41, 43–45, n.760 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(reporting testimony from officers explaining that “furtive movement is a very broad concept,” and 
could include a person “changing direction,” “walking in a certain way,” “[a]cting a little 
suspicious,” “making a movement that is not regular,” being “very fidgety,” “going in and out of his 
pocket,” “going in and out of a location,” “looking back and forth constantly,” “looking over their 
shoulder,” “adjusting their hip or their belt,” “moving in and out of a car too quickly,” “[t]urning a 
part of their body away from you,” “[g]rabbing at a certain pocket or something at their waist,” 
“getting a little nervous, maybe shaking” and “stutter[ing],” “hanging out in front of [a] building, 
sitting on the benches or something like that” and then making a “quick movement,” such as 
“bending down and quickly standing back up,” “going inside the lobby . . . and then quickly coming 
back out,” or “all of a sudden becom[ing] very nervous, very aware”). 
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In other words, this second estimate represents the effects of PC stops 
controlling for the totality of suspicion applied by officers in making PC 
stops in each block-group month. The results are reported as Incident 
Rate Ratios (IRR). An IRR expresses the change in the dependent 
variable given a change in the value of the predictor, with a mean of 1.0 
indicating no change.193 
The upper panel of Table 3 shows the effects of PC stops alone on 
crime. These estimates examine crimes with a lag and lead of two 
months. Each model is significant, although the large number of 
observations (6490 block groups for 108 months) reduces the 
importance of significance as a measure of model strength. More 
important are the effect sizes. The IRR estimates range from .924 for 
violent crimes to .969 for weapons offenses. Interpreting the IRR 
estimates as rates of change, these models show that for every increase 
of one PC stop, the various crime types will decline in each block group 
by anywhere from roughly three percent to seven percent. These are 
average effects across the block groups of the city over the 108 months 
of the study interval. 
  
 
 193  See, e.g., JOSEPH HILBE, NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION 111–12 (2011); Berk & 
MacDonald, supra note 179; Sander Greenland, Dose-Response and Trend Analysis in 
Epidemiology: Alternatives to Categorical Analysis, 6 EPIDEMIOLOGY 356, 359 (1996). 
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The lower panel of Table 3 shows the effects of PC stops interacted 
with the total number of stop factors marked by an officer in those 
stops, or the total quantity of suspicion in each case. The results are 
again significant in all models, and the IRR estimates this time are 
larger, ranging from .836 for weapons offenses to .680 for property 
crimes. Translating this into effect sizes, these estimates show 
reductions for each increase in PC stops from 16.2% for weapons 
offenses to approximately 32% for property and violent crimes. Again, 
these are average monthly effects across the block groups. In an era of 
declining crime rates in the city,194 these effects based on stop type are 
quite large. The implication as well is that higher concentrations of 
NPC stops are unproductive and add nothing to the crime control 
efforts of law enforcement. 
The concentration of PC stops varied in each block-group- month.  
The range of PC stop concentration raises the question of threshold 
effects. At what point do crime rates deflect downward as the 
concentration of PC stops increases? Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the 
marginal effects of PC stops at ten percent intervals in the distribution 
of PC stops. Marginal effects are the values of a predictor variable on 
the dependent variable in a regression that is estimated from the 
specific or fixed values of that predictor with the other predictors held 
constant at their means or averages.195 In this case, marginal effects 
are estimated on total crime for each ten percent increment of the 
percentage of PC stops in a block group-month. Each figure corresponds 
to the two regression strategies reported in Table 3: PC stops as a 
predictor (Figure 2.1), and PC stops plus total suspicion as a predictor 
(Figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 194  See NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP’T, HISTORICAL NEW YORK CITY CRIME DATA, 
http: //www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning /historical_nyc_crime_data.shtml 
[https: //perma.cc /PY6T-RWD7]. 
 195  Richard Williams, Using the Margins Command to Estimate and Interpret Adjusted 
Predictions and Marginal Effects, 12 STATA J. 308, 323–24 (2012); see also Michael J. Hanmer & 
Kerem O. Kalkan, Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted 
Probabilities and Marginal Effects From Limited Dependent Variable Models, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
263, 275 (2013). 
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Each figure shows that the crime reduction effects of PC stop 
concentration increase beginning when these stops exceed fifty percent 
of all stops in a block-group-month.  The effects are stable and modest 
up to a fifty percent concentration of PC stops, and then increase at 
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successive increments. The sharpest increase in crime reduction is at 
the highest concentrations of PC stops. Figure 2.1 shows that the 
marginal effects increase from about 1.75 fewer crimes at fifty percent 
to over two crimes per block group-month with a sharp increase from 
eighty percent to ninety percent. These are the effects attributable to 
PC stops and do not reflect other factors related to crime reductions, 
which the marginal effect model averages over the full range of PC 
stops in the marginal effects model. Figure 2.2 shows the same pattern. 
Estimates of the effects of PC stops together with total suspicion across 
those stops are stable up to a fifty percent concentration, and increase 
at each successive increment. The largest increase in marginal effects 
is at the last increment, from eighty percent to ninety percent. 
These analyses show the short-term effects of PC stop 
concentration at two month projections. This form of residual effect 
could decay over time as would-be offenders adjust to the increased risk 
of being stopped by the police, or as police officers rotate into and out of 
patrol assignments which can interrupt their learning and updating of 
their practices. An important question, then, is what are the residual 
effects of PC stop concentrations over longer intervals?196 To test for 
residual effects, the models in Table 3 were re-estimated in Table 4. 
Table 4 shows only the IRR for total crime and six specific categories of 
crime using a six-month lag and lead time parameter. The panel on the 
left of the table shows the IRR for PC stops only after six months; the 
panel on the right shows the effects of PC stops plus the totality of 
suspicion in those stops. 
Table 4 and Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that for both PC stops and 
PC stops with total suspicion, the crime reduction effects at six months 
are similar to the effects at two months. There are small and negligible 
differences in the effect sizes from two to six months for both sets of 
models. PC stops produce a 6.6% decline in total crime, and crime-
specific reductions ranging from 7.7% for violent crime to 3.1% for 
weapons offenses. The reductions in total crime for PC stops with total 
suspicion are nearly 30%, with crime-specific reductions ranging from 
16.5% for weapons offenses to 32.3% for property crimes. These 
percentages are based on generally low offense counts, but these 
monthly reductions aggregate over time to produce important and 
sizable safety benefits. 
 
 
 196 See Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence, 12 CRIME 
& JUST. 1, 11–12 (1990) (showing that the majority of empirical studies on police “crackdowns” or 
concentrated patrol strategies report initial but not long-term deterrent effects on crime after two 
months, despite continued patrol pressures and allocations of officers over a longer interval). 
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The comparative advantage in crime reduction benefits of focusing 
stops on indicia of suspicion that are more closely aligned with probable 
cause and behavioral markers are evident in these analyses. It would 
be important to identify the underlying mechanisms for these effects, 
but that would require a very different and ethically challenging 
research enterprise, including strong identification strategies that 
account for concurrent sources of deterrence, as well as testing the 
specific underlying mechanisms of deterrence.197 For now, it is not hard 
to imagine that by narrowing the scope of suspicion to behaviors more 
closely aligned with criminal activities, the emphasis on accuracy 
allows the signals of deterrence to be aimed more directly and less 
speculatively or subjectively at persons who may be deciding about a 
possible crime. Contemporary theories of deterrence agree that the 
risks of detection and apprehension are essential to effective 
deterrence.198 
V. REDEEMING THE ORIGINAL SIN 
There are tradeoffs in crime returns—shown here and in other 
studies assessing the effects of probable cause stops199—when stop 
regimes lean heavily on subjective or inchoate indicia of suspicion over 
more objective behavioral markers. This tradeoff is one part of Terry’s 
original sin. Officers can play hunches, but at a price. The original sin 
then, was less a question of moving away from Mapp’s probable cause 
standard than it was inviting police to use their authority to conduct 
temporary detentions and investigations based on the very hunches 
that worried the Terry Court.200  
The Terry Court, and subsequent Fourth Amendment opinions, 
chose to define neither the substantive criteria of reasonable suspicion, 
nor how much suspicion is required for police officers to conduct an 
 
 197  See generally Robert Apel, On the Deterrent Effects of Stop, Question, and Frisk, 15 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 27 (2016). 
 198  See Daniel Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 201 
(2013) (reviewing empirical and theoretical scholarship on deterrence over the past three decades); 
see also Robert Apel & Daniel S. Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence, in CRIME 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 4th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2011); 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science 
Investigation, 24 O.J.L.S. 173 (2004) (articulating the behavioral mechanisms of deterrence). 
 199  See, e.g., John MacDonald et al., The Effects of Local Police Surges on Crime and Arrests in 
New York City, 6 PLOS ONE, e0157223 11 (2016), http: //journals.plos.org /plosone/article? 
id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0157223 [https: //perma-archives.org /warc /W7KN-GEVN]. 
 200  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“The officer must be able to articulate more than an 
‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch’ of criminal activity.” The officer’s intuitions, 
gut feelings, and “sixth sense” about a situation are disallowed.); see also Craig S. Lerner, 
Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407, 419 (2006). 
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investigative stop.201 Even when courts exercised caution in expressing 
what is reasonable suspicion, the standards often were simply an 
elongated expression of Terry’s binary approach distinguishing 
reasonable suspicion from probable cause.202 For example, New York 
State standards are more demanding than the standards in other 
states for investigative stops203 as well as the Terry standard, yet the 
De Bour and Holman courts in New York defaulted to a subjective 
cascade of four increasing levels of intrusion.204 Redemption for Terry’s 
sins can come in two forms. 
A. Terry at Fifty 
Whether in the binary or a more detailed articulation of reasonable 
suspicion such as De Bour, the Terry component of the new policing 
seems, as practiced, to have failed at least the crime control prong of 
Terry’s balancing test.205 Along the way, Terry’s failure to provide 
substance or quantity to the concept of actionable “suspicion” created a 
subjective terrain that invited police to use broad assessments of 
 
 201  See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1695 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the vague empirical standards to determine whether the criteria of reasonable 
suspicion in vehicle or pedestrian stops as applied is “reasonable”); see also City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmund, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (stating that a “hit rate” of approximately nine percent at a 
random checkpoint does not justify a general purpose of stopping vehicles in a search for criminal 
activity). 
 202  See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (“The principal components [of 
reasonable suspicion] . . .” are “the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search” and 
“the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively 
reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion[.]”). 
 203  For example, Massachusetts follows constitutional standards in Terry v. Ohio. See 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Mass. 2001); see also supra note 98. 
 204  Tilem & Associates, New York Search and Seizure Law: Street Encounters with Police in 
New York – The Four Levels of Intrusion, N.Y. CRIM. ATT’Y BLOG, http: //www. 
newyorkcriminalattorneyblog.com/2010/01/new_york_search_and_seizure_la_1.html [https: // 
perma.cc /NLR3-E4MD]. People v. De Bour specifies four distinct levels of intrusion by a police 
officer, each linked to a permissible response. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 213 (N.Y. 1976). (1) Approaching a 
suspect to request information through non-threatening questions requires an objective or credible 
reason to interact with the suspect. See People v. Hollman & Saunders, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 184 (N.Y. 
1992). (2) Asking pointed questions that might lead an officer to believe that the person is 
suspected of a crime is based on the common law right of inquiry, and requires founded suspicion. 
See id. at 185. (3) A stop, or temporary but forcible detention, requires reasonable suspicion. 
Reasonable suspicion can also justify a frisk, if the officer fears that the suspect has a weapon.  
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2010); see also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
(4) Arrest and full search of a suspect requires probable cause. See United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 432 (1976); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 205  Terry’s balancing test was cast in 1968 as weighing the level of intrusion on the citizen 
versus the officer safety concerns. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); see Rosenthal, supra note 
153. But over time, the balancing test devolved into crime control payoffs—whether the intrusions 
were necessary to address public safety concerns. See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 154; Meares, 
supra note 44. 
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suspicion—at times, hunches—that have raised a steady stream of 
Fourth Amendment problems.206 While this was not unknown or 
unanticipated at the outset of the Terry era, the inherent subjectivity of 
reasonable suspicion became problematic decades later as the “new 
policing” unfolded and investigative stops became less a practice of 
individual discretion as a systematic policy-driven program.207 
Investigative stops were an essential element of modern proactive 
policing, and those often were pursued aggressively both in quantity 
and interaction quality. Yet, these analyses show in New York City 
that stops based on general categories of suspicion that are not tied to a 
particular behavior have no crime reduction benefit, even though they 
were encouraged in an effort to reduce crime. 
At the outset of the Terry era, in the midst of spiking crime rates 
and civil unrest,208 the Terry Court’s comments on reasonable suspicion 
were framed as making sure that an officer’s actions were reviewable 
both within police agencies and in the courts.209 Neither the Terry 
Court, nor later courts reviewing Terry’s standard, ever articulated 
sufficient detail to allow the police to know whether their actions were 
constitutional. Substance was almost never part of that discussion. 
While the reviewability prong of Terry’s doctrine no doubt anticipated a 
period of sorting out by appellate courts,210 what was a small caseload 
burden on the courts grew over the years into a long string of 
contentious decisions, nearly all of which expanded the scope of 
reasonable suspicion.211 So, one of Terry’s sins was placing a substantial 
burden of review on federal trial and appellate courts in a succession of 
suppression motions and constitutional challenges.212 That may well 
 
 206  See Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 427 
(2004) (claiming that Terry failed to achieve its stated purpose of tying the practice [or 
investigative stops] to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard); see also Harcourt & 
Meares, supra note 63 (claiming that intractable problems in regulating police discretion in Terry 
stops suggest that discretionary stops based on reasonable suspicion should be replaced by 
randomized stops that are tailored in probability to local crime rates). 
 207  See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 154; Meares, supra note 44. 
 208  See REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1967); see also WILLIAM 
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). 
 209  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (“Thus, in our system, evidentiary rulings provide 
the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as 
comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents.”). 
 210  See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brigoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); People v. Holman, 590 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1992); People v. De Bour, 352 
N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). 
 211  Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 
1899–1900 (2015). 
 212  A quick glance at the docket of the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division in 
the U.S. Department of Justice shows a roster of active consent decrees in twelve cities, nearly 
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have been the opposite of what the Terry court perhaps sought: to 
create a procedural rule that would relieve courts of that burden. 
Asking courts to perform a regulatory function in sorting out 
constitutional violations in everyday policing is one thing, but asking 
those same courts to do so in the absence of an articulable standard of 
conduct is asking too much. 
The story becomes more complicated by the fact that some stops, 
however subjective they may be, will be constitutional under the 
current case law. Even when a lawful stop proceeds with verbal or 
physical aggression by the officer, the stop can be lawful under Terry’s 
expansive view of reasonable suspicion.213 Stops are constitutional so 
long as officers can articulate facts that are reasonable to other officers 
given their knowledge and circumstances. But the story is complicated 
simply by the numbers: when suspicion becomes so inflated as to 
challenge the boundaries of legality, then it is the practice itself that 
becomes a contested constitutional matter. The boundary between 
lawful and unlawful policing is not easy to draw,214 but courts as well 
as government have done so now on several occasions.215 Still, when 
courts act as regulators of reasonable suspicion, police officers who are 
able and willing to spin their behavior in a way that will satisfy judges 
who reflexively defer to police “expertise,” while officers who are less 
verbally facile or who are transparent about their subjective 
assessment and motivations are more likely to be penalized.216 
The lesson here is that some bases of suspicion are both 
constitutional and productive, while others may be constitutional but 
unproductive, and still others are neither constitutional nor productive. 
But since all stops have costs that are borne by innocents as well as the 
 
half of which can be traced either to a pattern of Fourth Amendment violations in stops, or 
unwarranted racial disparities in the practice of Terry stops. See Civil Rights Div., Special 
Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http: //www.justice.gov/crt /special-
litigation-section-cases-and-matters0#police [https: //perma.cc /Z7TA-ABQG]; see also Rachel A. 
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 n.50 
(2009). 
 213  See Rebecca Kaplan, NYPD Chief: Policing Involving Use of Force, It Always Looks Awful, 
CBS NEWS (Dec. 7, 2014), http: //www.cbsnews.com/news/after-eric-garner-death-nypd-plans-
investigation-and-reforms/ [https: //perma.cc /48BD-NT57]. 
 214  See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 523 U.S. 41, 64 (1998) (showing the difficulty of 
designing a constitutionally valid basis for exerting police authority in the context of activities 
that might or might not be markers of criminal activity). 
 215  See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 137; Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: 
Normative and Empirical Challenges (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 15-003, 
2015). 
 216 See Lerner, supra note 200; see also Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police 
Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV.  (forthcoming 2017) (analyzing and critiquing the widespread judicial 
deference to police testimony and expertise in resolving Fourth Amendment claims). 
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guilty, communities and those stopped should not have to pay for those 
costs that are not worth it. Those stopped shouldn’t have to bear the 
burdens of police hunches or stops otherwise based on thin suspicion if 
they in fact are not guilty. This was one part of the “impossibility” that 
Professor Stuntz wrote about in 1998,217 shortly after the downside of 
the new policing became a focus of legal, political, and social conflict. 
B. Moving to Regulation 
A reset to more concrete indicia of suspicion suggested by the 
empirical results here hold promise to reverse those sins. Put simply, 
the Terry standard should be pushed toward a narrower and objective 
standard in light of this research. The reset involves two domains. One 
is a constitutional story that also raises regulatory issues. The 
constitutional story asks whether the procedure and subjective 
standards in Terry and later cases lead to violations of individual 
rights, and whether citizens can be asked to sacrifice those rights to 
social welfare criminal justice interests. The regulatory story is an 
institutional story: how to design models of oversight and assessment 
by accountable agents to ensure that the practices remain within the 
diffuse boundaries of reasonable suspicion, and also emphasizing the 
use of stops that maximize social welfare goals of crime deterrence. The 
regulatory challenge is to tether that practice both to the constitutional 
parameters and to practices that pay. 
The prospects for regulation of Terry stops through a more 
narrowly tailored schema of suspicion are good. At the least, shifting 
stops toward probable cause or behavioral indicia will shrink the stop 
circumstances that might otherwise be legally contested, reducing the 
burdens on trial and appellate courts. A shift in emphasis also creates a 
vocabulary and logic for internal audit, supervision, and regulation. 
Officers can be required to answer for what they do, not what they 
say.218 In contrast, it is not hard to imagine the difficulty of internally 
auditing the indicia of suspicion for the vague categories of “furtive 
movements” that were sharply criticized in the Floyd opinion.219 
Instead, the process of auditing a claim of “violent crime” or “drug 
transaction” or even the more subjective marker of “casing a store” can 
involve a perceptually shared set of behavioral categories that might be 
 
 217  See Stuntz, supra note 42; see also Meares, supra note 44. 
 218  Fagan & Geller, supra note 72; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 578 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (criticizing plaintiffs’ expert for being too conservative in estimating the extent of 
constitutionally flawed bases of suspicion for stops). 
 219  See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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more amenable to training on substantive criteria in lieu of procedural 
ones. Auditing of officers’ expressions of suspicion can promote learning 
and updating, which should be visible when officers’ actions are viewed 
across a range of citizen contacts. Auditing internally also creates a 
context of observational data that can inform collaboration among 
officers, and for democratic participation by politically accountable 
agents with police and citizens. The positive returns of collaboration 
have been observed in studies of police institutional reform in 
Cincinnati and other smaller departments.220 
C. Harm Reduction 
Hewing closer to objective and behaviorally specific markers of 
suspicion will narrow the circumstances where stops are conducted. A 
likely result will be a reduction in the scope and magnitude of false 
positives—low seizure and arrest rates, weak crime control returns—
observed in the Floyd and reported by monitors in Bailey v. City of 
Philadelphia221 litigation. Even though the Terry Court was careful to 
state that reasonable suspicion was necessary to authorize a frisk, not 
necessarily the stop itself, its crime control agenda moved reasonable 
suspicion from the background of the original opinion to the forefront of 
contemporary case law.222 And in linking Terry stops to a crime control 
agenda, it was not hard to explain how reasonable suspicion became 
the basis to justify an investigative stop.223  
Beyond the costs of a wrong guess by police that leads to a 
temporary street detention, the Terry Court worried about a variety of 
“petty indignities.”224 The indignities of this form of order maintenance 
in effect piled up from the accumulation of stops, not simply from 
 
 220  See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Due Process of Administration: The Problem of 
Police Accountability (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper 14-420, 2014); see also Eliot H. 
Schatmeier, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case Study of the Cincinnati Police 
Department, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 539, 557–59 (2012). 
 221  See Pl’s Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, Bailey v. City of 
Philadelphia, C.A. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
 222  See Meares, supra note 44; see, e.g., Wardlow v. Illinois, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (suggesting 
that ambiguous behaviors in a high crime area could heighten suspicion and justify a stop). But see 
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1141–44 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the overbreadth of “high crime area” as a component of reasonable 
suspicion). 
 223  See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 63. 
 224  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968) (“Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such 
a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a 
wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’ It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the 
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be 
undertaken lightly.”); see also Akil Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. R. 1100, 1101 (1998); Steiker, supra note 35. 
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publicly visible frisks.225 As Terry’s crime control agenda took root, the 
exposure of citizens, both innocents and those engaged in crime, to a 
new form street stops grew exponentially. The indignity problem arises 
not from the indignity of the frisk or the search, but from the context of 
the stop itself. And the dignity problem also arises not from the sheer 
prevalence of unproductive stops and the burden on innocents 
(although that itself is a concern), but from the ways those stops often 
are conducted.226 Even the most neutral of stops carries emotional 
freight and the threat of indignities. The concern here is what happens 
before, during, and after these stops, or how encounters with the police 
take place and then unfold, rather than on simply the regulatory 
questions of whether, where, and how often they occur.227 
Professor Stuntz identified four types of harm from inchoate and 
unproductive stops: (1) privacy incursions, or the coercive invasion of 
one’s property or body; (2) targeting harm, being singled out in public 
by the police and treated like a criminal suspect;228 (3) the harm of 
using racial bias to justify these incursions on liberty, or using race as a 
signal of suspicion if not criminality on black citizens simply by virtue 
of being black or moving about in a black neighborhood;229 and (4) the 
risks of verbal and physical force that accompanies stops and 
searches.230 
 
 225  See Stuntz, supra note 42; see also, Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional 
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a Pointless Indignity, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 989 
(2014) 
 226  See Apel, supra note 197 (noting the potential chilling effect on innocents who may be 
reluctant to move freely in public spheres fearing unwarranted Terry stops by police). 
 227  See Stuntz, supra note 42 (citing two dimensions of Fourth Amendment regulation that 
ignore interaction content and demeanor). 
 228  See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1501 (1996); see also CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED 
OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 134–51 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather 
eds., 2014). The first two types of harm are often joined. An innocent person could reasonably ask 
why me? Why would a police officer use her discretion to single out me of all people absent some 
concrete evidence or signs that I was up to no good? Why would s/he have a “hunch” that I am a 
criminal? Targeting harm then, encompasses both an innocence harm plus the basic harm to 
autonomy of targeting. 
 229  EPP ET AL., supra note 228. To a similar extent, the same harms accrue to Latino young 
men, as well as Latino and black young adults. See VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE 
LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS (2011). Bennet Capers refers to this as a form of “public 
shaming” that is skewed toward black men. See Bennet Capers, Policing, Race and Place, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 43, 68 (2009) (stating a similar claims in terms of “public shaming”). 
 230  See Rod K. Brunson & Ronald Weitzer, Police Relations with Black and White Youths in 
Different Urban Neighborhoods, 44 URB. AFFAIRS REV. 858, 869–73 (2009); see also Stuntz, supra 
note 42; RIOS, supra note 229; Michael Powell, Police Polish Image, but Concerns Persist, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at B1 (reporting on interviews with young Latino and black males on physical 
violence and harassment by police in everyday stop-and-frisk encounters in New York City during 
the latter half of 2008). 
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These psychological and perhaps physical harms risk not only 
indignities to the person, but also legitimacy costs to the larger 
community. Intrusive stops that are not based on actual perceived 
criminal behavior have reduce the perceived legitimacy of the police, 
and risk the harm of withdrawal of citizens from the co-production 
(with police) of security and public safety.231 The harms accrue from 
both direct and vicarious interactions—young persons observing the 
police are as likely to report lower police legitimacy as are those who 
have direct experience.232 They are less likely to serve on juries or 
cooperate with police in investigations of crime reports.233 
Assume that legitimacy is produced through the aggregation of 
interactions within individuals and authorities, and is a language and 
shared currency of social exchange signals that acknowledge the 
individual’s dignity, respect, worth and belonging is essential to 
democratic participation.234 If that were right, then simply reducing the 
scope of stops and narrowing the bases of suspicion to objective indicia 
of criminal activity would narrow the scope of indignities and harms. 
Targeting harms would be reduced by reining in “hunches” or actuarial 
suspicion based on police officers’ use of collective suspicion or Bayesian 
attributions of criminal intent.235 And narrowing would also reduce the 
emotional and psychological toll of these unwarranted intrusions.236 
“Why me?” would no longer be a salient question for the residents of 
many urban neighborhoods who bear much of the burden for the 
contemporary practice of Terry stops. 
The racial component of targeting harms in particular could be 
addressed through narrowing. Racial tensions are inextricably linked to 
 
 231  See, e.g., Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the 
Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1063 (2012); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey 
Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their 
Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 236–37 (2008); Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and 
Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 751, 758 (2014). 
 232  Tyler et al., supra note 231. 
 233  Id.; see also Tyler & Fagan, supra note 231. 
 234   See DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 15–16 (1991) (defining legitimacy 
along three dimensions, including rules that are justified “by reference to beliefs shared by both 
dominant and subordinate”); see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and 
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) (discussing ways in which legitimacy facilitates 
state exercise of power because individuals view authorities as morally or normatively 
appropriate). 
 235  See Fagan & Geller, supra note 72. 
 236  See Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Men, 104 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2323–24 (2014) (showing elevated rates of anxiety, post-traumatic 
stress symptoms, and perceived stigma as a function of increasing number of stops and increasing 
intrusiveness of those stops). 
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the drift in reasonable suspicion toward both subjectivity and 
programmatic overreach.237 Resetting to narrowly defined legal 
categories may not cure racial disparities, but would likely reduce the 
disparate exposure to policing by race by narrowing the circumstances 
for permissible stops. The heaping of indignities from law enforcement 
and other legal actors on African Americans has special meaning for 
that community. Glenn Loury explains how the pervasive societal 
stigmatization of African Americans marginalizes their community 
from the institutions and norms that “mainstream” society purports to 
value.238 
For African Americans, the sense of gain or loss suffered through 
the aggregation of social interactions with the state is an important 
part of collective or shared experiences.239 Conferring respect before the 
law means conferring social and democratic belonging, a form of social 
recognition that conveys the shared moral and legal norms between 
citizens and those who enforce the law. This sense of belonging and 
social recognition is described in rich detail by Charles Epp and his 
colleagues in Pulled Over,240 and suggests another, and perhaps more 
important, potential dignitary benefit of a narrower basis for stops. Epp 
et al. make an important distinction between being treated respectfully 
(whether or not lawfully) and being treated legally.241 The respondents 
in their survey were more concerned with being treated legally than 
with politeness or other procedural qualities.242 In this form of social 
recognition in law, we imagine ourselves as how other people see us, 
and we understand who we are in and through our relationships with 
others. This form of recognition by legal actors—by applying law 
equally—affects the ties of groups to legal authority, and to the moral 
norms that legal actors both express and enforce. In other words, being 
 
 237  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 575–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that 
the indicia of suspicion were different for non-white compared to white suspects, and that 
disparities in “hit rates” could reflect those differences—and weaknesses—in the suspicion that 
was used to justify stops of black and Latino citizens). 
 238  See GLENN LOURY, ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002). 
 239  See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 77 
(1994) (explaining the linked fate concept as a means of explaining the way that African 
Americans perceive what is in their individual self-interest.); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. 
Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority 
Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 179–80 (2008). 
 240  EPP ET AL., supra note 228. 
 241  See id. at 115–20. 
 242  Id.; see also Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police 
Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 345 (2004) (showing that 
officers engaged in unconstitutional searches were also more likely than officers who engaged in 
constitutional searches to be friendly and courteous to suspects). 
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nice is one thing, perhaps a low cost and generous if not patronizing act 
on the part of a legal actor holding considerable power, but expressively 
acknowledging the rights of a person before the law is quite another. 
Undoing dignitary harms leans strongly toward the latter view. 
D. Regulatory Algebra 
Substantive laws that criminalize relatively harmless or benign 
acts can animate the use of police power to carry out Terry stops to a 
broad spectrum of behaviors and actions.  But it was never clear that 
the use of Terry’s stop power was aimed at trivial crimes, or as a 
pretext for conducting field investigations as a fishing exercise based on 
hunches.243 Those hunches often are instantiated in current practice,244 
which seem to be artifacts of the capacious and inchoate indicia of 
reasonable suspicion. One remedy is to recalibrate suspicion in the 
context of Terry stops to move away from subjective criteria and 
reliance on officers’ experience-based judgments to a regime of 
objective, behaviorally-defined indicia of suspicion. 
The move toward more objective and behavioral bases of suspicion 
does not mean that the police should abandon the practice of Terry 
stops. What it does imply is that there is a tradeoff to using this power 
too broadly, and the regulatory response requires adjusting the 
thresholds for police contact. As a matter of policy, the broad use of 
Terry’s stop power is encouraged by the new policing, especially in the 
context of robust order maintenance regimes.245 Therein lies the 
trouble. Terry stops should require a higher level of suspicion than an 
officer’s hunch or subjective appraisal that “crime is afoot”. The Terry 
Court never said which crimes had to be “afoot” to justify a stop, only 
that the act was criminal. When the criminal law is so broadly 
enforced, and when non-criminal violations or local ordinances are 
integrated with the overall mission of street policing to detect weapons 
and control violence, the likelihood increases that both benign and 
serious crimes will be part of the umbrella of suspicion. The burden of 
proof for administrative violations or low-level misdemeanor offenses is 
 
 243  The Terry Court abhorred hunches, terming them “inarticulate.” 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) 
(holding that intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights must be based on more than 
inarticulate hunches). 
 244  Fifth Pl’s Progress Report, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 221; Opinion and 
Order, supra note 176 (linking the low seizure rates to Fourth Amendment violations in carrying 
out Terry stops). 
 245  Heymann, supra note 154; see, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of 
Life in Public Spaces: Courts, Communities and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. R. 551, 558 (1997); 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 58–59 (2003). 
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intrinsically lower than for felony offenses and places Terry’s 
fundamental rules at risk. 
Imagine that we have two types of acts—a benign act and a 
harmful one. Intervening in the relatively benign act, such as a 
violation of an administrative code, seems to benefit almost no one—
there are few public benefits to crime control in that instance, since the 
range of harm is largely private or de minimus. Even if one accepts that 
some aspects of disorder may be criminogenic, itself a heavily contested 
notion, the argument here is that the treatment through criminal 
enforcement may have iatrogenic effects on legitimacy and cooperation. 
That is, we may stop someone from smoking in public, or drinking from 
an open container, playing loud music in a residential area, or jumping 
turnstiles on public transit. We may signal “order” by enforcing these 
laws, but their relationship to public safety is path dependent on the 
questionable relationship between theories of social or physical disorder 
and crime.246 Worse, such enforcement may engender withdrawal if not 
resistance to cooperation with the police.247 This may seem like an 
efficient use of a scarce public good—policing—because “hit rates” may 
be high, but the yield for public safety is low if these low-level crimes 
are not gateways to violence or major property crimes. 
 
 
Figure 4. Probability Distributions for Strength of Evidence 
 
Source: Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738, 757 (2011). 
 
 246  See, e.g., BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, 
Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L. J. 457, 467 (2000); Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 178; Sampson & Raudenbush, 
Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 
105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 611 (1999). 
 247  Tyler & Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation, supra note 231. 
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More important, the burden of proof in these instances is 
intrinsically low.248 Policing benign acts may satisfy the demand for 
metrics of police productivity, but its contribution to crime control is 
dubious.249 Aggressive enforcement of benign acts also has efficiency 
costs by distracting police from intervening in the more harmful ones. 
It is only in the shared space of benign and harmful acts, where it 
makes sense to intervene in the benign act at a lower standard of proof, 
and the size of that shared space is part of a contentious debate.250 The 
social harms from undetected harmful acts will outweigh any private or 
small-scale benefits from intervening in the benign acts. Figure 4 
illustrates how the social good in the form of public safety seems to be 
greater when we focus our attention on the more serious acts. In other 
words, do not sweat the little stuff, and focus on more serious acts with 
more consequential public harms. This is simple regulatory algebra. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Both law enforcement and citizen interests are better served by a 
recalibration of Terry standards to move them closer to Mapp’s more 
exacting probable cause standard. A more workable and easily 
understood standard for regulating police use of the stop power would 
create a more comfortable space internally for police to monitor, audit, 
and regulate compliance with constitutional law as well as internal 
policy. And it also can provide a standard that moves away from the 
subjective criteria that Terry invited and toward criteria that are less 
vulnerable to cognitive error, perceptual distortions, and social harms. 
Secondary benefits for legitimacy may well follow. Penance for Terry’s 
original sin is within reach. 
 
 248  See Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738, 748 (2011) (arguing that strong 
evidence is necessary to assign liability or culpability since the proof burden can affect the design 
accuracy of enforcement). 
 249  Anthony A. Braga, Brandon C. Welsh & Cory Schnell, Can Policing Disorder Reduce Crime? 
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 52 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 567, 578 (2015) (reporting 
non-significant effects of aggressive order-maintenance policing strategies on crime reduction). 
 250  Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 178. 
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  APPENDIX A  
Aggregate Category Suspected Offenses  
Murder Murder 
Violent Crime Aggravated Assault  
 Aggravated Harassment  
 Aggravated Sexual Abuse  
 Assault  
 Kidnapping  
 Rape  
 Robbery  
Minor Violent Crime  Harassment  
 Hazing  
 Jostling 
 Menacing  
 Reckless Endangerment  
 Resisting Arrest  
 Riot  
 Unlawful Imprisonment  
 Vehicular Assault  
Drug Crime  Criminal Possession of Controlled Substances  
 Criminal Sale of Controlled Substances  
 Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia  
 Other Drug Offenses  
Marijuana Possession  Criminal Possession of Marijuana  
Marijuana Sale  Criminal Sale of Marijuana  
Part I Property Crime  Arson  
 Burglary 
 Grand Larceny  
 Grand Larceny Auto  
Minor Property Crime  Auto Stripping  
 Computer Trespass  
 Criminal Possession of Stolen Property  
 Criminal Mischief  
 Criminal Possession of Computer Materials  
 Criminal Possession of Forged Instruments  
 Criminal Tampering  
 Misapplication of Property  
 Petit Larceny  
Possession of Burglar Tools  
Reckless Endangerment of Property  
Theft of Services  
Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle 
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Fraud and Related Falsifying Business Records  
 Forgery  
 Forgery of a VIN  
 Fraud  
 Fraudulent Accosting  
 Insurance Fraud  
 Tampering with a Public Record  
 Unlawful Use of Credit Card, Debit  
Trespass Criminal Trespass  
Prostitution and Related  Prostitution  
Terrorism  Terrorism  
Quality of Life/Disorder  Eavesdropping  
 Fortune Telling  
 Gambling  
 Loitering 
 Making Graffiti  
 Obscenity  
 Obstructing Firefighting Operations  
 Obstructing Governmental Administration  
 Possession of Graffiti Instruments  
 Trademark Counterfeiting  
 Unlawfully Dealing with Fireworks  
 Unauthorized Recording 
 Unlawful Assembly 
 Disorderly Conduct  
 Quality of Life  
 Riding Bike on the Sidewalk  
 Alcohol Violation  
Sex Crimes and Related  Abortion 
 Adultery 
 Bigamy  
 Course of Sexual Conduct  
 Incest  
 Public Display of Offensive Sexual Material  
 Public Lewdness  
 Sexual Abuse  
 Sexual Misconduct  
 Sodomy 
 Forcible Touching 
Other Minor Sex Crimes 
 
